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## THESIS

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FROM CLASSROOM TO WARROOM: INTERNALIZING, INTEGRATING  
AND REINFORCING LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT, EDUCATION  
AND TRAINING (LMET) SKILLS IN THE NAVY

by

Patricia G. Foley

December 1983

Thesis Advisor:

R.A. McGonigal

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From Classroom to Wardroom: Internalizing, Integrating  
and Reinforcing Leadership and Management, Education  
and Training (IMET) Skills in the Navy

by

Patricia G. Foley  
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy  
B.A., George Washington University, 1973  
M.A., University of Virginia 1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 1983

Author:

Patricia G. Foley

Approved by:

Richard G. Ligoniel

Thesis Advisor

William D. Bishop

Second Reader

Richard A. Elter

Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

K.T. Marshall

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

# ABSTRACT

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This report describes the current role of the Navy Leadership and Management, Education and Training Program (LMET), and analyzes the benefits and limitations of Navy-wide implementation. This methodology focused specifically on the incentives and constraints on utilization of LMET competencies. Interviews of a cross-section of 70 LMET graduates were conducted in an effort to determine key factors to promote competency use. Results indicate specific recommendations regarding the use of the Navy's Human Resource Management Support System to reinforce LMET training. ↑

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War in 415 B.C. presented perhaps the first systematic document illustrating the crucial role that individual leaders play in determining the victory or defeat of their states. Through the presentation of twelve vividly drawn characters, Thucydides implicitly expressed some of the signal qualities of great leaders and managers. He repeatedly noted the importance of training leaders, and stated that "true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action." Yet he did not attempt to explore how leaders can be developed. On the contrary, his history, and specifically, the account of the Sicilian Expedition, presented an unforgettable warning of the consequences of the failure to replicate the previous standards of Athenian leadership. Between Nicias, who was an honorable man, and Alcibiades, who was not, the Athenians engineered their own defeat. Indeed, Thucydides' history is an early but not uncommon illustration of the thesis that more wars are lost than they are won.

Despite their exhaustive knowledge of the dangers of poor leadership, men during the 2400 years since Thucydides have continued to express their frustration with the difficulty of defining what good leadership is, and how, [or if], it can be taught. This exercise has been even more tantalizing

because most agree that leadership, if indefinable, is certainly recognizable. Justice White's comment on obscenity applies equally as well to leadership: "I know it when I see it."

Assuming, then, that effective leadership is a vital, if elusive, key to military strength, the U.S. Navy has taken the position that leaders can be "made," and leadership, like the baton of command, can be handed down from generation to generation of Naval officers. It is the goal of this study to describe the Navy's latest attempt to effect this objective, to evaluate the current status of the Leadership and Management, Education and Training (LMET) program, and to recommend methods of reinforcing the existing efforts.

The experience of developing this particular study, and the Navy's efforts in this area, have served to illustrate the old Spanish proverb, "It is not the same thing to talk of bulls as to be in the bull ring." The only meaningful test of the Navy's LMET program will not be this work or any other, but the demonstrated effectiveness of the U.S. Navy a generation from now. It is important to remember that superior leadership is ultimately measured, not by individual careers, but by the ability of the Navy as an organization to carry out national policy. Concentration on improving leadership, carried to an article of faith in the last four decades, has narrowed the focus of vision of those most committed to this goal. Good leadership and mission accomplishment are neither mutually exclusive, conflicting, nor even

separate goals. The quality of leadership inevitably will, and must, be measured by performance. No matter how honorable, intelligent, persuasive, or charismatic is a Nicias, a Brutus, a Napoleon, or a Lee, they all still lost their wars, the ultimate test of military effectiveness. Leadership, then, and the Navy LMET program specifically, cannot be implemented or evaluated in a meaningful way unless one simultaneously considers organizational change in the Navy. The salient difference between this study and previous evaluations of the LMET program is that it will attempt to incorporate the goal of improved leadership with other programs to effect organizational change in the Navy.

This view, however, insinuates a major methodological problem: it is virtually impossible to measure with any degree of scientific rigor the short-term effects of the Navy-wide LMET program if one insists that organizational, not individual, change must be the touchstone of success. Yet, given the enormous resources invested in the LMET program to date, the need to "test the waters," to obtain some qualitative judgment of the program's effectiveness still exists. This study will not attempt to procreate reams of statistics only to conclude that they are not significant at this time. The evaluations contained herein justifiably can be criticized as impressionistic and subjective. This paper reflects the judgment that there are other truths than statistical truths. It is the choice between being roughly right and precisely wrong.

Such a methodology carries a logic and value of its own; what it lacks in rigor, it compensates by providing a deeper, richer understanding. Moreover, this approach reflects a certain artistic decorum: a congruence between the subject and the style. For such subjective evaluation and strategic decision-making are precisely what leaders are required to do:

Life cannot wait until the sciences may have explained the universe scientifically. We cannot put off living until we are ready. The most salient characteristic of life is its coerciveness: it is always urgent, 'here and now,' without any possible postponement. Life is fired at us point blank.

(Jose Ortega y Gasset)

Finally, it is hoped that this study will contain material of some practical benefit to the Navy. The outlined case studies, workshops, and other methods of reinforcing LMET competencies are considered to be the heart of this study.



## II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAVY LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING

### A. LITERATURE REVIEW

Comprehensive studies specifically addressing the development of Navy leadership and management training programs have been few, although the quantity of literature regarding theories of motivation, learning, and organizational change is mind boggling. Three previous works dealing with Navy leadership training are particularly relevant. All are noteworthy for their thoroughness and scholarship. Their findings have contributed extensively to this study, particularly in regard to the history of Navy leadership training programs and the impetus for the development of LMET.

Auel's Leadership and Management Education and Training Long Range Study Proposal is a Navy source document drafted in 1975 advocating the development of a leadership training program based on rigorous empirical research which would seek to develop specific leadership and management skills in a systematic and comprehensive training program. In short, it advocated the development of LMET.

Parker's Leadership Training in the Navy, a master's thesis prepared for the University of Michigan in 1980, presented the Navy's training efforts as a reflection of various theories of motivation and organizational development. He traced the development of Navy leadership training as both a

response to specific organizational problems and as a trend toward defining, specifying, and transmitting specific skills, culminating in an analysis of the Navy's LMET program.

Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET)

Effectiveness: A Pilot Study for Evaluation is a master's thesis written by Lieutenant Commanders Vandover and Villarosa for the Naval Postgraduate School in 1981. This study advocated the need to assess the effectiveness of the Navy's LMET program in attaining its stated goals. It demonstrated the advantages of the use of the pilot study as an evaluation technique. It identified general issues of concern regarding LMET. Finally, it recommended the implementation of a broader pilot study to provide ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of the LMET program.

All three studies reviewed the history of Navy leadership training efforts. All three studies demonstrated a primary concern for efficiency and effectiveness of these training efforts in changing individual behavior. The formal and technical aspects of training are stressed. Finally, the genesis and development of leadership and management training as a form of technology transfer is a central theme in previous studies.

This work seeks to examine the role of organizational and cultural interface with formal training in the Navy, the difference between what is taught and what is learned. It is hoped that a slightly different angle of view will sharpen

and refine the chiaroscuro of the subject of study. For this reason, this study will review the history of Navy leadership training, admirably presented in previous works, in order to highlight the role of the organization in reinforcing classroom training.

#### B. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NAVY LEADERSHIP

From its inception, the U.S. Navy has recognized that "in no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military" (MacArthur). Furthermore, it has placed leadership as the paramount goal of training.

Although the U.S. Navy adopted almost wholeheartedly the practices, values, and traditions of the Royal Navy from which it sprang, it differed from the beginning in one crucial respect. It refuted, by the very act of revolution which inspired its founding, the precept that a certain class of men by birth are destined to be leaders. One of the tenets of the Enlightenment was expressed by Voltaire: "the right of command is no longer an advantage transmitted by nature, like an inheritance; it is the fruit of labors, the price of courage."

Nevertheless, it adopted the practices of developing leaders than current in the Royal Navy. Young boys were signed on as cabin boys at the age of seven under the care and tutelage of commanding officers of specific ships. This

system was a legacy of the traditional apprentice system dating back to the Renaissance.

The traditional training pattern of cabin boy to midshipman to officer had many glaring weaknesses. Because young men often received their entire training on one vessel with one commanding officer, wardroom, and crew, the quality of their training varied tremendously from ship to ship. Training in the specific skills of seamanship and navigation was haphazard and uncoded. Leadership was not explicitly addressed. It was expected that midshipment would learn to be naval officers and leaders by observing the example of others, by listening to tales of naval heroes and naval exploits, and by taking to heart traditional homilies of naval wisdom.

The strengths of this traditional apprenticeship program are perhaps less obvious but no less effective. Graduates of such training included John Paul Jones, Nathaniel Bowditch, and David Farragut who assumed his first command at sea at the age of thirteen. The long years of apprenticeship and practice compensated for inadequate or inconsistent technical education. This system excelled in its formal and informal education. That is, it took children at an impressionable age, enveloped them in the "alien" Navy culture, and through years of association transmitted the values and beliefs considered essential to a navy officer: Duty, Honor, Country. Moreover, by testing the young midshipmen and by ensuring that

they would have years of experience divorced from diversions, this system successfully imbued them with a firm conception of "the Navy way" or the way things are done, informal learning.

While the methods of the apprentice midshipman system were successful, the objectives of this training varied greatly from ship to ship. Hence, the early U.S. Navy produced officers who had thoroughly assimilated a world view, a sense of accepted practices and customs, and some practical technical skills. The difficulty lay in that nobody, with any assurance, could say precisely what any individual midshipman had learned.

#### C. DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING

##### 1. The Naval Academy

One of the earliest steps to rationalize, standardize, and improve the quality of leadership training in the Navy was the establishment of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland in 1845. From its establishment, the Naval Academy sought to teach both management and leadership skills: the first and last years of the five year curriculum were spent in academic study; the three intervening years were spent at sea. Its stated purpose was, and remains, "to produce self-confident leaders who accept and are fully ready to carry out their responsibilities both to the nation they serve and the personnel they command" (U.S. Naval Academy Catalogue, 76-77).

The superiority of the academic training, the technical and management skills required of Naval officers, that the Naval Academy provided is confirmed. The Academy also has been largely successful at instilling common values and a respect for Navy traditions by replicating an environment similar to that experienced by midshipmen of an earlier era. The Academy is an isolated environment in which midshipmen are constantly tested and imbued with the traditions and values of the Navy:

Here, by precept and example, the application of sound techniques of leadership, counsel, and guidance, and, when required, corrective or disciplinary action, midshipmen are measured, molded, and motivated for the day when they will join the Navy or the Marine Corps as commissioned officers.

(U.S. Naval Academy Catalogue 76-77)

The Naval Academy exhibits the trickle-down theory of leadership training. A relatively small select body of individuals are molded, at great cost in time and resources, in the expectation that their example and influence throughout their naval careers will improve the leadership and readiness of the entire Navy. In MacArthur's phrase, they are the drop of ink that "will color the water." This traditional approach to leadership training was satisfactory until World War II, when all of the services required rapid and drastic augmentation.

## 2. World War II: Lessons Learned

Shortly thereafter appeared the phenomenon of the "ninety day wonder," officers who completed three months of

intense military training and then received reserve commissions. This procedure was later institutionalized in 1951, when the Officers' Candidate School was permanently established in Newport, Rhode Island. It has continued to provide a training safety valve to produce large numbers of reserve officers when rapid increases in officer manning were required.

The experience of World War II changed the U.S. Navy to a degree that no previous or subsequent war has. The Navy carried the burden of the war in the Pacific; its role was both more complex and more enduring than at any previous time. It drafted huge numbers of civilians, many of whom performed outstandingly, and most of whom performed in manners at odds with, or oblivious to, traditional Navy practices. This experience, coupled with the recognition that the Navy of the future would be required to carry out the responsibilities of the United States as the premier maritime nation of the world, created a need to augment traditional methods of Navy leadership training. With the advent of nuclear warfare, the consequences of failure had become awesome, while the requirement for responsiveness, flexibility, and incisive judgment had become correspondingly more pressing. One training manual summarized this plight:

The expansion of our Navy, the introduction of modern sophisticated equipment and the requirement of heavy operating schedules has forced junior officers into the position of immediate responsibility with no time for apprenticeship. This, coupled with the attendant induction of many non-career men has

disturbed if not destroyed this traditional system of the indoctrination of young officers.

(Division Officer's Guide, 1950)

The post-war Navy's initial response to this need was to codify and clarify its standards in reams of drastically revised and expanded directives. The revised Navy Regulations was promulgated in 1948, followed by a revised Shipboard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), The Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the Code of Conduct. The thrust of reasoning behind these new directives was clear; their purpose was to reduce the realm of individual decision-making by issuing explicit orders. Contemporary with these new instructions were several manuals written and issued to standardize and compress training. The Division Officers' Guide, The Watch Officers' Guide, and The Armed Forces Officer are examples of this effort. The Navy had recognized that it could no longer afford the luxury of years of cultural assimilation of its members. Thus, it attempted to ensure the transmission of its norms and traditions primarily through technical rather than formal and informal learning. The new guides were flogged as "the distilled experience of thousands of junior officers who have gone before you" (Division Officer's Guide, 1950).

### 3. Leadership By Fiat: The 1950's and 1960's

The Secretary of the Navy took a more active posture toward improving the quality of leadership in the Navy in 1958 by issuing General Order 21. Again, this order reflected



the Navy's previous response to the quandry of leadership training; it sought to clarify, to make explicit, to leave no room for doubt. It provided the official Navy definition of leadership as

the art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people. It is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understanding and of moral character that enable a man to inspire and to manage a group of people successfully. Effective leadership, therefore, is based on personal example, good management practices, and moral responsibility.

(CNP, 1963)

It ordered all commanding officers to incorporate leadership training into the technical training of their subordinates. What the Navy could no longer accomplish through cultural influence and tradition in a rapidly changing society, it hoped to accomplish by ukase. The naivete of this order was confirmed by its negligible and pro forma effect: "cut and paste" directives were duly produced; leadership training duties were delegated and re-delegated; and masses of junior officers and young petty officers fidgeted through meetings peppered with phrases such as "when I had command," or worse, stonily listened to a peer stammer through any document that conceivably could meet the requirement for leadership training. Increased gun-decking of this requirement was the response to a largely ineffective program. The Navy's response to declining emphasis on leadership training was to re-issue the General Order in 1963. Since the Navy did little to assist commanding officers to implement this order, however, the response was just as predictably ineffective.

The Navy exhibited another common tactic in its quest for the chimera of good leadership in 1966: a change in emphasis from the desirable to the doable. Leadership training requirements were reduced to five single topics and incorporated in the Navy's General Military Training program (Auel, 1975). In effect, leadership was now placed on an equal plane with such topics as the evils of venereal disease and the moral imperative of blood donorship. Standard lesson plans and material were distributed to all Navy commands. Navy personnel were now bored by standardized and authoritative material. Thus, the history of leadership training could be seen as a pedestrian and bureaucratic response to a bureaucratic directive. A previous study concluded that "the leadership program fell victim to its own frills and was downgraded by the Navy Institutionalists, because it was an intervention without sufficient input from line managers" (Auel, 1975).

#### 4. Panic in the Pentagon: The Viet Nam Legacy

The Navy, during the end of the Viet Nam era, witnessed an aging and deteriorating fleet of ships, increased maintenance problems, and a host of personnel problems: drug and alcohol abuse, NJP, unauthorized absence rates, and racial tensions were increasing, while retention of petty officers and junior officers continued to decline. Two major aircraft carrier fires and mounting racial tensions signalled declining readiness and morale in the Navy, while technological developments demanded ever higher-quality personnel.

Some felt that these problems merely reflected the violence of the United States during the late 1960's, and the disaffection and cynicism of the Watergate era, and predicted that the Navy would return to an even keel as the Viet Nam war wound down. However, other Navy manpower specialists projected even worse seas ahead: they feared that the Navy would be unable to recruit satisfactory personnel with the advent of the all volunteer force, and they predicted that continued poor retention rates would create a paucity of first-line supervisors to train the new personnel. They also felt that projected increases in minority recruits would serve to aggravate the existing racial and ethnic frictions.

During this tenuous transition period, ADM Zumwalt was deep-selected as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Unlike his predecessors, Zumwalt felt that leadership training alone was doomed to be ineffective unless it was supported by sweeping changes in the organizational norms of the Navy. Therefore, he sought to effect a radical change in the cultural fabric of the Navy itself. For this he incurred the opprobrium of those who held these traditional Navy values most dear: the senior officers and the chief petty officers of the Navy, who felt that he was destroying their authority and the efficacy of the chain of command.

Zumwalt, like those who went before him, established his programs by fiat. However, his methods differed radically

from his predecessors; he made heavy use of the Navy media to ensure direct contact with Navy personnel. His use of CNO SITREP films, highly publicized tours, and especially his Z-grams promulgating new policy directly to all Navy commands, were viewed by some as an insult to the Navy hierarchy.

In retrospect, ADM Zumwalt's approach could be described as a two-pronged attack, both a top-down and later a bottom-up organizational intervention. But to do so makes the Zumwalt efforts appear to be a closely detailed, coherent strategy. In reality, the impetus for change seemed so pressing, that decisions were often made very rapidly and changes dictated before implementation plans were completed. Z-grams were virtually a weekly occurrence, and the focus remained on "the big picture." In summary, the Human Goals program, the prototype of the Human Resources Management Support System (HRMS), really accrued in piecemeal fashion from various Z-grams instituting programs to meet specific needs. Nevertheless, the effect of Zumwalt's change efforts were to force change from the top by establishing new definitions, training requirements, practices, and standards of morale. By establishing a series of new commands outside the line chain of command, Zumwalt also hoped to achieve change from the bottom up through Human Goals Officers, Racial Awareness Facilitators, and Drug and Alcohol Counselors. These efforts were buttressed by new recruiting

policies actively seeking out qualified minority and female volunteers.

In 1970, Z-gram 55 established a task force to study and make recommendations to improve personnel management and the flow of communication up and down the chain of command. The task force chose the Blake and Mouton managerial grid model among those reviewed as the most useful for the Navy's purpose. The Navy's N-man book was developed in 1972, and incorporated in leadership training. However, it was criticized as being idealistic, simplistic, and rigid. Moreover, although it encouraged Navy leaders to demonstrate high levels of concern for both achievement and personnel, it did not equip them with the means to do so. Self-awareness and motivation to change were supposed to be sufficient to improve their leadership. These criticism, coupled with the embarrassment of a pending lawsuit regarding the Navy's adoption of Blake and Mouton's model, prompted the Navy to drop this approach.

It next developed a seven step model which reflected more of a contingency approach while retaining the task and people concepts. This model was used in a Command Development course in 1972.

The Human Resources Management Support System (HRMSS) was established in 1973, incorporating both leadership training and the various Human Goals programs in an effort to provide greater quality control of the various entities. The

Human Resource Management Centers were placed under the control of Fleet Commanders and specified Type Commanders. The Human Resource Management School was established in 1974 in order to upgrade and standardize the training and qualifications of HRM personnel.

During this period, the two week leadership training program continued as perhaps the least offensive of the HRM efforts. Its target population was the middle management of the Navy, E-6 through O-3 pay grades. Although some standardized material was provided for the use of HRM units, the content of the courses varied widely. Each unit retained wide autonomy in the content and presentation. For that reason, it is difficult to characterize the training. At its worst, it consisted of the grid model buttressed by traditional pearls of Navy wisdom and sea stories. Usually, it presented several extant theories of management followed by some case studies for discussion.

ADM Holloway's selection as Chief of Naval Operations in 1974 signalled a return to greater emphasis on operational readiness, reliance on the chain of command, and stricter discipline. His stress on leadership training, coupled with the desire of the HRM community to strengthen this area, promoted the development of Leadership Management Training (LMET). This training was based largely on Transactional Analysis theory which had gained currency in civilian sectors. Fifteen authorized training sites opened in 1974, with specially

trained LMT instructors. LMT followed the pattern of previous courses, concentrating on E-6's, E-7's, and O-1's through O-3's. It was well-received, especially considering the general resistance in the Navy at that time to any HRM activity. Unfortunately, the quality of the LMT program deteriorated by virtue of its own popularity and the hunger of Navy personnel and commanding officers alike for an interesting and useful leadership training course.

Frustrated by the difficulty of obtaining quotas at the authorized training sites, commanding officers established bootleg LMT courses within their own commands. This allowed the commanding officers greater flexibility in scheduling their personnel, and enabled them to attain almost 100 percent attendance. "By 1976, there were 167 Leadership and Management courses being taught, but only 15 were authorized" (Mansfield, 1982). Students rarely knew whether they had attended an authorized course or not, and much of their increasing criticism of LMT can be ascribed to these bootleg courses. Nevertheless, even the authorized version of LMT tended to be more theoretical than practical in its emphasis.

#### D. INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF LMET

##### 1. Initial Goals of LMET

In 1973, the Navy sought to review, rationalize, and coordinate its various leadership training programs under the umbrella of a single, integrated and cumulative training strategy directly related to the actual leadership and

management requirements of Navy leaders at crucial levels in the chain of command. The resources the Navy expended on leadership training at that time were significant, but the results of these efforts were questionable. The Navy conducted "58 formal training courses and 11 correspondence courses costing 12.8 million dollars a year" in 1975 (Auel, 1975 as cited in Vandover and Villarosa, 1981). Several Navy studies were initiated to propose the best method to accomplish this goal. Then the decision was made to utilize the experience of civilian industry and academia to seek a fresh approach to the improvement of the Navy's leadership training program. The Navy contracted with McBer and Company to research and develop a practicable and integrated leadership training program. Its goals were stated as follows:

To provide a formal and systematic program for professional development of Navy leaders at critical points in their careers, based on research of effective Navy leadership.

To train officers and petty officers in the specific leadership and management skills needed to perform effectively at their level in the chain of command.

To conduct ongoing evaluation for improving and updating these programs.

To encourage Navy leaders to take personal responsibility for implementing effective leadership skills, by means of an educational approach that emphasizes individual initiative and accountability for effective performance as a Navy leader.

(HRMC, N.D. p. 7)

## 2. Theoretical Basis and Implicit Ideology of LMET

David McClelland, the co-founder of McBer and Company, has provided the most consistent and pervasive influence



on his corporation's basic tenets and methodology. Hence, he may be viewed as the father of LMET. McClelland was a clinical psychologist of the behavioral school who concentrated on motivation and motive acquisition theory. In that regard, McClelland reflected the primary interests of his era in psychology. But, unlike Herzberg or Maslow, who concentrated on a needs-based motivation theory; and unlike Lewin, Vroom and Yetton, Fiedler, Likert, McGregor, Blake and Mouton, Bennis, and Rappaport who reflected interactional, contingency-oriented approaches; McClelland pursued a personal traits focus on motivation. In The Achieving Society and "Power Is the Great Motivator," McClelland elaborated and refined his contention that the desires for power and achievement are the strongest individual motivating forces.

McClelland specialized in constructing personnel selection tests for specific job categories in civilian industries. Later, he and McBer, Inc., concentrated their efforts on designing and conducting customized training programs to articulate and induce students to practice specific operationalized characteristics deemed critical for superior performance in specific jobs.

However, McClelland was distinguished less for his theories than for his consistent emphasis on painstaking empirical research and rigorous scientific approach. In short, McClelland sought to apply technical, quantitative methods and sophisticated statistical analysis to the study

of superior job performance. McClelland's views and methodology were original and refreshing in his era. Moreover, they satisfied the needs and appealed to corporate clients.

McClelland's studies reflected the following characteristics:

1. Emphasis on the individual worker.
2. Belief that the organization is the sum of the individuals.
3. Belief that personal motivation is the key to a productive and effective organization.
4. Emphasis on the "first class man," the superior performer.
5. Belief that superior performers exhibit specific personal traits which make them successful.
6. Belief that skills are job specific.
7. Emphasis on extensive data gathering by observing workers.
8. Belief that critical traits can be identified, classified, and operationalized.
9. Distinction between critical and threshold skills.
10. Emphasis on quantifying data and deducing critical skills through statistical analysis.
11. Belief that workers can improve their performance through training, i.e., these skills can be developed and replicated.
12. Overall objective of increased productivity and organizational efficiency.

The appeal of McClelland's theories and methodology to top management of civilian or military organizations is clearly evident. In the first place, his approach is geared to improving performance, a continuing goal of most organizations. Secondly, it is extremely pragmatic.

McClelland's statement that "If you want to test who will be a good policeman, go find what a policeman does. Follow him around, make a list of his activities, and sample from that list in screening applicants" (McClelland, 1973), is virtually guaranteed to elicit agreement from the police chief. McClelland's principle of criterion sampling, then, is not only pragmatic, but subtly flattering to top management. McBer's approach defuses the threat of alien experts intruding to tell top management how to run their organization. On the contrary, it implies that the superior performers (including top management) are the proper template for others to copy.

McBer's approach, then, stresses improvement through scientific analysis. This, too, is appealing. It is analogous to creating a technical library and "A" school for leadership and management. This straightforward approach appears to transform an extremely nebulous area into a clear, systematic, quantifiable program. This, too, is appealing to managers attuned to overseeing highly technical or financial arenas.

Finally, McBer's approach is basically optimistic. Implicit in its strategy is the belief that individuals can be trained, and leaders can be made. Training can be an extremely attractive alternative to an organization still reeling with distress from the experience of radical organizational change. Training becomes an even more seductive

option when that training is designed and implemented by the consulting firm. It is not difficult to understand why the Navy in 1975 readily accepted McBer's outlined research and training development proposal. McBer's approach contained similar characteristics and appeal that PERT did when it was developed and used to successfully in building the first Polaris submarine.

It can be contended that McClelland's approach to organizational effectiveness is remarkably similar to Frederick Taylor's theories described in his seminal monograph, "Principles of Scientific Management." A short comparison is instructive. Taylor specified four key principles:

The first of the great principles of scientific management...is the deliberate gathering together of the great mass of traditional knowledge which, in the past, has been in the heads of the workmen, recording it, tabulating it, reducing it in most cases to rules, laws, and in many cases to mathematical formulae, which, with these new laws, are applied to the work of the workmen.

The next of the four principles of scientific management is the scientific selection of the workmen, and then his progressive development. The new way is to take a great deal of trouble in selecting the workman.

The third principle is the bringing together of this science...and the trained workman.... Offer him a plan, something worthwhile.... If he will not do it, let him get out.

The fourth principal...involves a complete redivision of the work of the establishment.... It is team work.

(Taylor, 1915)

McBer's LMET program and Taylor's Scientific Management hold several concepts in common: the emphasis on precise data

gathering, the importance of selecting and observing superior performers, the reliance on quantifying and designing "the best way," and the faith in training. Similarly, both exhibit a results-oriented approach. Taylor concluded his essay with, "The very fair and proper question, the only question to ask is 'Does it pay?' because if scientific management does not pay, there is nothing in it" (Taylor, 1915). It can be argued that McClelland has applied the principles of Scientific Management to the tasks of leadership and management.

### 3. LMET Research

McBer consultants commenced research to develop the Navy LMET program in 1976 utilizing the methodology which McClelland had refined during previous studies in civilian industry. They sought to gather data to answer the question, "What makes a good Navy leader?" (Winter, 1979). Since the Navy was by far the largest organization that McBer had studied, they determined that a sampling technique was the preferred method to obtain data and generate inferences about the population. Extremely restrictive sampling was the only way that the company could conduct the extensive interviews they desired, given time and resource constraints. However, the necessity for restrictive sampling caused something of a methodological problem for McBer, since McClelland had maintained that research should be job specific, and the Navy presented such a bewildering variety of leadership levels and

situations. A very structured sampling technique was chosen to satisfy these conflicting requirements. This technique combined elements of both quota sampling and purposive sampling (Stone, 1978). That is, nominations of outstanding leaders were solicited from commanding officers of each fleet. Thus, the sample members were "hand picked" as superior leaders to develop a sample that was satisfactory to the needs of the study. Quota sampling was utilized within this selected group to ensure that all eight leadership levels to be studied and the warfare communities were proportionately represented. The initial research was restricted to fleet units in Norfolk and San Diego, possibly adding a tinge of convenience sampling to skew the findings. A control group of "average" leaders was also selected, again reflecting the various career ascension points and warfare communities. Through this process, "51 people (30 outstanding, 21 average) from the Pacific Fleet, and 78 people (38 outstanding, 40 average) from the Atlantic Fleet were identified to participate in the Behavioral Event Interview process" (Mansfield, 1982).

The Pacific Fleet interviews were conducted first. The Behavioral Event Interview was the central technique of data gathering. The objectives of this technique were to synthesize the advantages of the structured and unstructured interview styles. That is, it sought to give the subject freedom of choice in the events he related to the interviewer and preserve the richness, individuality, texture, and detail

of the unstructured interview process. Yet, through extensive training and practice, the interviewer "probed" to elicit clarification of behaviors and other pertinent information.

The Behavioral Event Interview focused on critical incidents in the subject's career. Each subject was asked to describe in great detail three unsuccessful and three successful critical events. A useful incident would give a clear and full account of the situation that led up to the event, the participants, the subject's behavior and feelings in responding to the situation, and its outcome (Winter, 1979). The purpose of such a detailed description was to elicit a clear understanding of a superior leader's behaviors in critical incidents.

From the 51 Pacific Fleet interviews, 36 were screened as unbiased and useful for further study. A statistical analysis identified 27 competency elements for study. Coding and analysis of all 51 interviews indicated that the demonstrated frequency of most of these competencies differentiated the superior from average leaders.

The next step in the research was to validate this initial list of competencies. The Atlantic Fleet interviews were conducted and scored "blind;" the interviewers were not told if their subjects were superior or average. The competencies which were demonstrated as also statistically significant in frequency among the Atlantic Fleet group were then included in the list of Navy leadership competencies (Winter, 1979).

A second validation technique utilized written questionnaires to measure the use of the preliminary list of competencies derived from the interviews. Nine different tests were developed to measure specific competency elements. 1,000 Navy officers and enlisted personnel representing the billet levels, warfare communities, and both fleets took the tests under a controlled environment (Mansfield, 1982). The purpose of this series of tests was to provide a larger N against which to validate the interview findings. Additionally, 61 of the interview subjects were tested to provide a measure of correlation between the two research methods. Behavioral indicator variables were derived from the test results when a variable "was significantly correlated with evidence of a competency element in an interview" (Mansfield, 1982). A performance rating sheet completed by the test takers' superiors provided a final means of cross-checking and verifying differences in competency use between superior and average performers. See Table 1 for a flowchart of McBer's Job Competency Assessment Process.

The test results were then cross-tabbed with job specific tasks and billets to provide further information regarding situational differences in competency use (Winter, 1979). Sixteen of the initial 27 competencies revealed statistically significant correlations and were labeled competencies distinguishing superior leadership. These 16 fleet competencies are specified and defined in Table 2.



TABLE 1

MCBER'S JOB COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT PROCESS

DETERMINE STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE OF MANAGERS	IDENTIFY SUPERIOR AND AVERAGE MANAGERS	STUDY WHAT PEOPLE ACTUALLY DO THAT DISTINGUISHES SUPERIOR FROM AVERAGE MANAGERS
	IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERIOR BEHAVIOR, I.E., IDENTIFICATION OF COMPETENCIES	VALIDATE AGAINST PERFORMANCE DATA

Reference:  
Excerpted from  
A.M.A. Review

TABLE 2

THE 16 FLEET COMPETENCIES

Following are the 16 fleet competencies and their working definitions:

1. Sets Goals and Performance Standards. Outstanding Navy leaders set goals to improve task performance and use them to assess the ongoing performance of a task, as well as the task's results.

2. Takes Initiative. When a problem is encountered, outstanding Navy leaders take initiative in defining it, accept the responsibility of acting on it, and move immediately to solve it.

3. Plans and Organizes. Outstanding Navy leaders plan and organize tasks, people, and resources in their order of importance, and schedule the tasks for the achievement of their goal.

4. Optimizes Use of Resources. Outstanding Navy leaders match individuals' capabilities with job requirements to maximize task accomplishment.

5. Delegates. Outstanding Navy leaders use the chain of command to assign tasks by methods other than a direct order, to get subordinates to accept task responsibility.

6. Monitors Results. Outstanding Navy leaders systematically check progress on task accomplishment.

7. Rewards. Outstanding Navy leaders recognize and reward for effective performance on a specific task.

8. Disciplines. In holding subordinates accountable for work goals and Navy standards, outstanding Navy leaders appropriately discipline subordinates, in order to increase the likelihood of the subordinates' improved performance.

9. Self-control. Outstanding Navy leaders hold back an impulse and instead weigh the facts, keep a balanced perspective, and act appropriately.

10. Influences. Outstanding Navy leaders persuade people skillfully--up, across, and down the chain of command--to accomplish tasks and maintain the organization.

11. Team Builds. Outstanding Navy leaders promote teamwork within their work group and with other work groups.

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

12. Develops Subordinates. Outstanding Navy leaders spend time working with their subordinates, coaching them toward improved performance and helping them to be skillful and responsible in getting the job done at a high standard.

13. Positive Expectations. Outstanding Navy leaders trust in people's basic worth and ability to perform. They approach subordinates with a desire for the subordinates' development.

14. Realistic Expectations. Although outstanding Navy leaders believe that most subordinates want to and can do a good job, they take care not to set a subordinate up for failure by expecting too much. Concern about a subordinate's shortcomings is expressed honestly.

15. Understands. Outstanding Navy leaders identify subordinates' problems and help them to understand these problems. Such leaders appropriately aid others in solving their problems.

16. Conceptualizes. Outstanding Navy leaders dig out the relevant facts in a complex situation and organize those facts to gain a clear understanding of the situation before acting.

Reference:

Excerpted from Mansfield, 1982

Table 3 indicates the correlation of specific competencies with billet levels.

#### 4. LMET Instructional Design and Implementation

The key assumption of LMET is that the 16 identified fleet competencies can be acquired through study and practice, and that increased use of these competencies will result in improved leadership and management in the Navy. Translating the competencies into a training program is a process that has been given little attention in previous studies.

The LMET courses designed by McBer and Company are based on a five step theoretical model of learning. This learning process is illustrated in Table 9. McBer first organized the 16 competencies into five clusters of similar skills. See Table 4. Each cluster is addressed individually throughout the course, and the students are guided through the learning process for each cluster. This learning process entails the following activities: recognition; understanding; self-assessment in relation to the competency; skill acquisition and practice; and job application.

McBer's description of each step in the learning process is provided as follows:

1. Recognition. Participants form clear concepts of the desired knowledge, skills, attitudes, personal qualities, or values by recognizing the competency in the specific, actual thoughts and actions of superior Navy leaders. Participants realize that troublesome problems of the type they actually encounter call for the competencies in question. Typically, the recognition step uses material adapted from actual critical incidents that were collected

TABLE 3

IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FLEET COMPETENCIES  
AT DIFFERENT LEVELS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

An "X" indicates that the competency is relevant to performance in that billet. An "XX" indicates that the competency is especially important to performance in the billet.<sup>1</sup>

Competencies <sup>2</sup>	CO/XO	DH/DO	MCPO/LCPO	LPO/PO
<u>CONCERN FOR EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS</u>				
1. Sets Goals and Performance Standards	X	XX	X	XX
2. Takes Initiative	XX	XX	XX	XX
<u>MANAGEMENT CONTROL</u>				
1. Plans and Organizes	XX	XX	XX	XX
2. Optimizes Use of Resources	XX	X	XX	X
3. Delegates	XX	XX	XX	XX
4. Monitors Results	XX	XX	XX	XX
5. Rewards	X	XX	X	X
6. Disciplines <sup>2</sup>	X	X	X	X
<u>SKILLFUL USE OF INFLUENCE</u>				
1. Self-control	XX	XX	XX	XX
2. Influences	XX	XX	XX	XX
3. Team Builds <sup>2</sup>	X	X	X	X
4. Develops Subordinates <sup>2</sup>	X	X	X	X

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

Competencies <sup>2</sup>	CO/XO	DH/DO	MCPO/LCPO	LPO/PO
<u>ADVISING AND COUNSELING</u>				
1. Positive Expectations	XX	XX	XX	XX
2. Realistic Expectations	X	X	X	XX
3. Understands <sup>2</sup>	X	X	X	X
<u>CONCEPTUAL THINKING</u>				
1. Conceptualizes	XX	X	XX	XX

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<sup>1</sup>Among persons with largely leadership and management responsibilities.

<sup>2</sup>The indicator variables for these competencies did not distinguish superior from average performers, so that their relative importance among different billets cannot be assessed with the data at hand.

Reference:  
Excerpted from Mansfield, 1982

TABLE 4

THE COMPETENCY MODEL FOR THE FLEET  
AS ORGANIZED FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
1. CONCERN FOR EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS Cluster	
a. Sets Goals and Performance Standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishes specific goals</li> <li>• Is concerned with standards of task performance</li> <li>• Revises goals to make them realistic</li> <li>• Sets deadlines for tasks' accomplishment</li> </ul>
b. Takes Initiative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is a self-starter</li> <li>• Anticipates situations, rather than reacting to them</li> <li>• Takes new actions or forms new plans without being told to do so</li> <li>• Is resourceful and persistent</li> </ul>
2. MANAGEMENT CONTROL Cluster	
a. Plans and Organizes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identifies action steps, resources, and obstacles involved in reaching an objective</li> <li>• Prepares an action plan</li> <li>• Analyzes and ranks alternative courses of action</li> <li>• Organizes and schedules people, material, or activities in new ways to accomplish a task</li> <li>• Sets priorities by organizing tasks in a hierarchy of importance</li> </ul>

TABLE 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
b. Optimizes Use of Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Matches people and jobs to get the best performance</li> <li>• Fully uses the human resources available for tasks</li> <li>• Considers trade-offs between task requirements and people's morale</li> </ul>
c. Delegates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clearly assigns authority to others for task accomplishment</li> <li>• Uses the chain of command to get subordinates to share in task management</li> <li>• Through methods other than direct orders, encourages people to seek task-management responsibility</li> </ul>
d. Monitors Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Keeps track of a work process by seeking information on its progress or by direct observation</li> <li>• Checks on results of own and others' actions</li> <li>• Evaluates the outcome of a task against a standard of performance</li> </ul>
e. Rewards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides positive feedback to people on their performance of a specific task</li> <li>• Officially recognizes people for their accomplishments</li> </ul>



TABLE 4 (Cont'd).

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
f. Disciplines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides negative feedback to subordinates on inappropriate appearance, behavior, or performance</li> <li>• Holds subordinates accountable, and gives appropriate discipline</li> </ul>
3. SKILLFUL USE OF INFLUENCE Cluster	
a. Self-control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Holds back an impulse to say or do something inappropriate</li> <li>• Does not show anger under attack</li> <li>• Makes decisions only after identifying and weighing all the facts</li> <li>• Controls the urge to "do it myself," and instead manages others to take responsibility for tasks assigned to them</li> </ul>
b. Influences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Sells" ideas by putting them in terms of others' self-interest</li> <li>• Builds political coalitions or potential influence networks</li> <li>• Gains people's commitment to organizational goals, traditions, and values, by appealing to a higher purpose</li> <li>• Makes people feel strong</li> <li>• Influences by personal example; i.e., models desirable behavior</li> </ul>

TABLE 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
c. Team Builds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explains why, shares information, communicates the purpose of actions</li> <li>• Communicates the need for cooperation</li> <li>• Organizes teamwork for important nonroutine tasks that require cooperation between individuals and among work groups</li> <li>• Acts to create symbols of a group's identity, pride, or team effort</li> </ul>
d. Develops Subordinates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfers his/her expertise to others through example</li> <li>• Provides the information and encouragement necessary to get the job done</li> <li>• Coaches, by making training opportunities, expert help, and other resources available to subordinates</li> </ul>
4. ADVISING AND COUNSELING Cluster	
a. Positive Expectations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Possesses strong conviction that people are capable of doing good work when given the chance</li> <li>• Has generalized positive feelings for people</li> <li>• Believes that subordinates are valuable resources</li> </ul>
b. Realistic Expectations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has doubts or concerns about an individual's ability to perform</li> </ul>

TABLE 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Behavioral Indicators</u>
c. Understands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has a realistic concern that people may not follow or effectively carry out instructions</li> <li>• Acknowledges an individual's shortcomings as well as strengths</li> <li>• Is willing to express displeasure, disappointment, and concern about the shortcomings of an individual's performance</li> </ul>
5. CONCEPTUAL THINKING Cluster (containing only one competency)	
a. Conceptualizes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accepts the feelings of another person</li> <li>• Figures out a person's motivation, and has evidence to back up the diagnosis</li> <li>• Responds to people appropriately in order to get the job done</li> <li>• Rigorously searches for and identifies the available facts</li> <li>• Organizes facts and draws realistic inferences</li> <li>• Analyzes information about a situation by comparing what exists now with what ideally should exist, in order to develop an overall plan of action</li> <li>• Draws conclusions and makes judgments based on and supported by factual evidence</li> </ul>

Reference:  
Excerpted from Mansfield, 1982

in the Behavioral Event Interviews used in the earlier research phase of LMET design. Introducing the competencies in this direct, experiential way creates maximum relevance and thus a strong motivation for learning.

2. Understanding. Participants integrate the knowledge that was learned in the previous step into their own way of thinking, in order to understand the competencies in their own personal "language," as connected to their own experiences and concerns.
3. Self-assessment in relation to the competency. Participants recognize the relevance of the skills, attitudes, and personal qualities to their own jobs, careers, and life goals. They develop a sense of their own level in each competency by a variety of assessment and self-assessment techniques. As a result, they can identify specific areas for change and self-improvement.
4. Skill acquisition and practice. Participants practice the skills and attitudes associated with each competency, especially those that have been identified for improvement in the previous step. The atmosphere created in the courses is supportive and free from distractions, so as to allow practice of new skills and refinement of existing skills.
5. Job application. Participants demonstrate and receive feedback on the application of new knowledge or improved skills and attitudes in the classroom. They then go on to identify situations in their Navy jobs where they will use the competencies. Participants set goals, anticipate obstacles, and...

(Winter, 1979)

Thus, the instructional process is both discrete and cumulative. The instructional techniques are extremely varied and designed to appeal to a variety of learning styles, although some bias toward concrete learning and active experimentation is evident.

McBer has attempted to include the following kinds of activities within the segment on each of the five clusters:

1. Traditional educational techniques such as lectures, readings, and written worksheets.
2. Discussions in both small and larger groups.
3. Group exercises.
4. Self-assessment through standardized tests and procedures developed especially for LMET (about which the participants learn).
5. Case studies.
6. Films (both explicitly instructional films and general films that have a vivid didactic application).
7. Simulation exercises (including adaptations of standard management simulation procedures, hypothetical situations for which participants give an oral presentation of a written plan, and role-playing exercises).

(Winter, 1979)

However, the overriding objective of the LMET course is not explicitly stated to the students and mentioned only in passing in the design proposal. That is, "to enhance the students sense of personal worth or self-image" (Winter, 1979). Many of the instructional characteristics of the LMET courses have been implemented with this basic objective in mind. A great effort has been made to provide a safe, supportive, and non-threatening environment to facilitate clearer self-assessment by the students, and to provide incentive to improve. For this reason, the classes are comprised of peers who are generally between tours of duty. The results of the self-assessment exercises are not necessarily shared with

the class, nor are all activities, e.g., the ring toss game, explicitly labeled as self-assessment exercises. The thrust of the course is to provide guidance through the process of individual self-discovery, desire to improve, and initial attempts to acquire and master competencies. The emphasis throughout the course is on each individual's unique talents and potential to excel, and an open, non-judgmental atmosphere is fostered by the instructors.

In summary, McBer and Company did not presume to be able to ensure that LMET graduates would master and apply all of the 16 LMET competencies in their jobs after completion of a two week course. Instead, McBer sought to instill in the students increased self-awareness, competency, recognition, initial application of competencies in a safe and supportive environment, and the motivation to improve their skills in future assignments. "The ultimate goal is to foster students' continuing self-development in the leadership competencies," one McBer report stated (Winter, 1979).

In essence, the LMET course is primarily a motivator for individually monitored self-improvement.

The personal comprehensive plan is the final activity in all LMET courses. It is a statement of personal goals, shaped to the concepts and language of the leadership competency model. Participants are encouraged to formulate and describe realistic yet challenging goals that are appropriate to their Navy leadership situations, to become aware of difficulties and obstacles to these goals, and to write out specific action steps to overcome the obstacles and attain the goals.

A distinctive feature of LMET courses is the personal student log, which the participant retains as a written

record of the LMET experience. It contains his or her self-assessment, life situation, and goals--all phrased in terms of the now-familiar language of the competencies as he or she understands them. It is a personal written record of strengths and weaknesses, always set against the standard of competencies that are associated with excellence and superior Navy leadership performance.

(Winter, 1979)

Thus, the student log and the personal action plan are the primary means of reinforcing the LMET competency acquisition process. This technique is based on McClelland's earlier motive development program described in his monograph, "Toward a Theory of Motive Acquisition." McClelland stated, "the participants were to regard themselves as 'in training' for the next two years, in that 10-14 days is too short a time to do more than conceive a new way of life" (McClelland, 1965 as cited in Vandover and Villarosa, 1981). According to McClelland's own assessment, his course positively affected two out of three graduates (McClelland, 1965 as cited in Vandover and Villarosa, 1981).


McBer's efforts to date have concentrated on initial implementation of LMET course for the Navy. Tables 5 and 6 specify the implementation of LMET course to date. Implementation of LMET for specific communities, such as the Supply Corps and Recruit Training Command, has entailed modification of the basic courses to custom tailor them to the needs of these communities.

The Fleet LMET courses, which were the first to be established, have trained only about twenty-five percent of

TABLE 5

MCBER'S FLOWCHART OF THE NAVY LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT PROCESSES IN TERMS OF THE COMPETENCIES

Flow Chart of the Navy Leadership and Management Processes  
in Terms of the Cross-Validated Competencies



Reference:  
[Excerpted from Winter, 1979]



TABLE 6

## LMET COURSES IMPLEMENTED THROUGH 1981

<u>Location</u>	<u>Course</u>
a. TRITRAFAC Bangor, WA	LCPO LPO
b. NAVSUBTRACENPAC Pearl Harbor, HI	LCPO LPO
c. NAVTECHTRACEN Treasure Island, CA	DO (AVIA) LCPO LPO
d. NAVPHIBSCOL Coronado, CA	PCO/PXO DH (AVIA) DO (AVIA) LCPO LPO SDO
e. SWOS DET San Diego, CA	DO (SWO)
f. NAVSUBSCOL New London, CT	PXO (SUB) DH (SUB) DO (SUB) LCPO LPO
g. SWOSCOL Newport, RI	DH (SWO) DO (SWO)
h. NAVPHIBSCOL Little Creek, VA	PCO/PXO DH (AVIA) DO (AVIA) LCPO LPO SDO
i. FLEMINEWARTRACEN Charleston, SC	LCPO LPO
j. FLETRACEN Mayport, FL	DH (AVIA) DO (AVIA) LCPO LPO
k. NAVAVSCOLCOM Pensacola, FL	DO (AVIA)

TABLE 6 (Cont'd)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Course</u>
l. HRMD Rota, Spain	SDO LCPO
m. SSC San Diego, CA	LPO
n. Great Lakes (BT 6 YO Program)	PO
o. HRMSCOL Memphis, TN	LMET INSTR (OFF & ENL)

Reference:  
Excerpted from Mansfield, 1982

current fleet personnel to date. Chronic undermanning at the E-6 level has tended to reduce the number of first class petty officer graduates. Recent critical shortages of lieutenant commanders and the consequent decision to reduce the strength of officer training programs by one-third have served to increase the pressure to shorten or waive the requirement for all personnel who are ordered to fleet billets to attend LMET. The severest blow to continued implementation of LMET to date was the decision to terminate the course for Prospective Commanding Officers.

#### 5. Initial Evaluations

In 1981, Captain William Jackson, the Navy's LMET program manager, expressed his concerns regarding evaluation of the effectiveness of the LMET program:

Some people may do very well in the training course, but they may not be able to apply what they've learned out on the job....It's been very difficult to evaluate. There's a certain amount of just feeling that it's the right thing to do. So far, we've relied mainly on the favorable reports we hear informally from commanding officers whose men have been through the training.

(Goleman, 1981)

Although a full-scale evaluation of the Navy LMET program has yet to be conducted, there have been several efforts to evaluate and improve certain aspects of the program. First, and perhaps the most important among these evaluations, are the reactions of the students themselves expressed in critiques at the end of the courses. These critiques have been extremely favorable. The students have

TABLE 7

## LMET COURSES BEING IMPLEMENTED IN 1982

<u>Location</u>	<u>Course</u>
a. USNA, Annapolis, MD	Naval Academy Professional Development Instructors and Company Officers
b. Navy Supply Corps School Athens, GA	DO Supply
c. Officer Indoctrination School (OIS), Newport, RI	DO Staff Corps (Doctors, Nurses, CEC Officers, JAG, MSC)
d. Officer Candidate School (OCS), Newport, RI	OCS Instructors
e. Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Instructor Training, Annapolis, MD	NROTC Instructors
f. Recruit Training Command/ "A" School (Memphis, Little Creek, San Diego, Great Lakes)	RTC Company Commanders/ "A" School Instructors

Reference:  
Excerpted from Mansfield, 1982

TABLE 8

LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS ADDRESSED IN LM'T-SDO

1) Unauthorized Absence	<p>a) is a performance problem which can be addressed in performance review and counseling sessions. Refer to performance review and counseling guidelines in Lesson 5.4 - <u>Performance Review and Counseling.</u></p> <p>b) can be a symptom of a deeper problem requiring referral to a helping resource. Refer to guidelines for making a referral in Lesson 5.5 - <u>The Referral Process.</u></p> <p>c) requires the application of disciplinary action. Refer to guidelines for rewarding and disciplining in Lesson 3.4 - <u>Rewarding and Disciplining.</u></p> <p>d) requires a response which would motivate a person to change behavior. Refer to influence strategies in Lesson 4.4 - <u>Influence Strategies and Networks.</u></p>
2) Peer Pressure Influencing Misbehavior	<p>a) is illustrated in the ethics and values cases and responded to by highlighting the ethical dimensions of leadership and management. Refer to lecture and case studies in Lesson 6.3 - <u>Ethics and Values.</u></p> <p>b) is illustrated and dealt with in the "Tattoo Incident" case study and corresponding exercise. Refer to material in Lesson 6.3 - <u>The Tattoo Incident.</u></p> <p>c) is addressed in the audiotape, "The Care and Feeding of New Recruits" and its corresponding exercise. Refer to the Instructor Guide Appendix.</p> <p>d) requires a response which would motivate a person to change behavior. Refer to influence strategies in Lesson 4.4 - <u>Influence Strategies &amp; Networks.</u></p>

TABLE 8 (Cont'd)

3) Chain of Command Breakdown	<p>a) occurs in an organization when clarity is low and flexibility is high. Refer to the clarity and flexibility dimensions of organizational climate in <u>Lesson 4.10 - Organizational Climate</u>.</p> <p>b) is addressed in guidelines for the referral process which emphasize resolving problems within the chain of command before utilizing outside resources. Refer to <u>Lesson 5.5 - The Referral Process</u>.</p> <p>c) is a performance problem which can be addressed in performance review and counseling sessions. Refer to guidelines for performance review in <u>Lesson 5.4 - Performance Review &amp; Counseling</u>.</p> <p>d) is illustrated and responded to in the Tatoo Incident case study and exercise. Refer to <u>Lesson 6.3 - The Tatoo Incident</u>.</p>
4) Responsibilities of Junior Leaders	<p>a) are often in conflict with their attempts to maintain peer loyalty. Refer to <u>Case #1 in Lesson 4.7 - Situational Leadership</u>.</p> <p>b) are illustrated in case studies and emphasized in the lecture on ethical dimension of leadership and management. Refer to <u>Lesson 6.3 - Ethics and Values</u>.</p> <p>c) can be discharged effectively by utilizing skills of delegation and monitoring. Refer to guidelines and case in <u>Lesson 3.3 - Delegation and Monitoring Results</u>.</p>
5) Poor Use of Time	<p>a) is addressed through the identification of time wasters and time management techniques in <u>Lesson 2.4 - Time Management</u>.</p>

TABLE 8 (Cont'd)

	<p>b) can be alleviated to a great degree by planning and organizing work and optimizing use of resources. Refer to guidelines in <u>Lesson 3.2 - Planning and Organizing and Optimizing Use of Resources.</u></p>
6) Difficulty in Learning to Supervise	<p>a) is addressed in all lessons of the <u>Management Control Competency Cluster - Lessons 3.1-3.5</u> and the <u>Skillful Use of Influence Competency Cluster - Lessons 4.1-4.11.</u></p>
7) Lack of Understanding of Division Officer and Division CPO Roles	<p>a) occurs when clarity in an organization is low. Refer to the clarity dimension of organizational climate in <u>Lesson 4.10 - Organizational Climate.</u></p> <p>b) can be addressed through the effective delegation of work tasks. Refer to guidelines and case study in <u>Lesson 3.3 - Delegation and Monitoring Results.</u></p>
8) Poor Personal Example Setting	<p>a) is addressed in the CNO message which intends to motivate students to use competencies and to act as positive role models.</p> <p>b) can be changed by acquiring an awareness of and skill in influencing behavior. Refer to <u>Lesson 4.1-4.11 - Skillful Use of Influence Competency Cluster.</u></p> <p>c) can be counteracted by applying skills learned in the <u>Efficiency and Effectiveness and the Management Control Competency Clusters.</u></p>
9) Varying Use of Discipline	<p>a) resulting from a lack of understanding of situation-ally appropriate discipline is addressed through case studies and discussion in <u>Lesson 3.4 - Rewarding and Disciplining.</u></p>

TABLE 8 (Cont'd)

10) Performance Counseling Shortfall	<p>a) can be corrected by applying counseling techniques and performance review guidelines identified and practiced in Lesson 5.3 - <u>Advising and Counseling Situations and Techniques</u> and Lesson 5.4 - <u>Performance Review and Counseling</u>.</p>
11) Motivating Senior Personnel with Poor Attitudes	<p>a) is often difficult for junior leaders. Cases of performance problems exhibited by senior personnel and guidelines for addressing these problems are contained in Lesson 5.4 - <u>Performance Review and Counseling</u>.</p> <p>b) necessitates an understanding of situational leadership which states that leadership style should vary with task and maturity of work force. Refer to Lesson 4.7 - <u>Situational Leadership</u>.</p> <p>c) can be accomplished through the skillful use of influence. Refer to Lessons 4.1-4.11 - <u>Skillful Use of Influence Competency Cluster</u>.</p>
12) Senior/Subordinate Working Relationships	<p>a) are addressed in lectures, cases and exercises in the <u>Management Control, Skillful Use of Influence and the Advising and Counseling Competency Clusters</u>.</p>
13) Fostering Pride & Professionalism & Traditional Navy Values	<p>a) can be accomplished by applying competencies outlined and practiced in Lessons 4.1-4.11 - <u>Skillful Use of Influence Competency Cluster</u>.</p>
14) Team Work	<p>a) and productivity are affected by people's perception of the organizational climate in their work environment. Refer to lecture on climate dimensions in Lesson 4.10 - <u>Organizational Climate: The Key to Team Building</u>.</p>



TABLE 8 (Cont'd)

15) Substance Abuse	a) is addressed in a module being developed and tested for the LCPO course. Based on field test results, this module will be modified for inclusion in all other IMET courses.
16) Women in the Navy	a) is addressed in the PCO/PXO course. The SDO course does not explicitly address this issue. It has been suggested that BEIs be conducted to identify key problems associated with women in the Navy and course material be developed from this data.
17) Inadequate Writing Skill	a) is not addressed in the SDO course.
18) Civilian/Military Working Problems	a) are not addressed in fleet courses since these courses focus on fleet problems and not on shore problems.
19) Fitrep/Evaluation Administration	a) is not addressed in the SDO course. There is no material on the evolution of Fitrep or Evaluation nor on problems associated with the change from semi-annual to annual evaluations.
20) Equal Opportunity	a) is not explicitly addressed in the SDO course.
21) Multicultural Environment Problems	a) are addressed in the LCPO and LPO courses through the Seaman Capito Role Play. Additional case studies will be developed from data collected in the USN PGS study of Navy managers of heterogeneous work groups.

TABLE 9

THE COMPETENCY ACQUISITION PROCESS

- RECOGNITION

Recognition of the competency when one sees it

- UNDERSTANDING

Understanding how the competency relates to managerial performance

- ASSESSMENT

Measurement to determine to what degree the competency is possessed

- EXPERIMENTATION

Trying new behaviors

- PRACTICE

Using the competency on the job

- APPLICATION

Consistent use of the competency on the job appropriate to the context

Reference:  
Excerpted from Winter, 1979

very much enjoyed the course. This alone represents a vast improvement over previous leadership training efforts attempted by the Navy. Such reactions have been evident even among those who were initially dubious of the value of the course. Comments such as, "I thought it was going to be just another bullshit course, but I really got a lot out of it," are representative of a common student reaction.

A second area of continuing scrutiny is instructional technique. The LMET instructor course at Human Resource Management School, Memphis, under aegis of CNET, has consistently refined its screening, training, and evaluation of prospective instructors. Similarly, LMET schools, especially those at Coronado and Little Creek, have initiated and recommended many improvements in instructional techniques based on student reactions. Finally, the establishment of Quality Assurance branches at some schools has provided a means of independent evaluation of innovative techniques and a vehicle for continuous assessment of the quality and content of the actual instruction.

A third arena of evaluation was stipulated in the contractual agreement between McBer and Company and the Navy. It specified three areas of evaluation: continued validation of the identified competencies; design and implementation of tests to measure individual performance levels; and a study of the effect of LMET on indicators of Navy organizational performance standards. McBer and Company has

conducted studies to refine and cross-validate competencies and their behavioral indicators. It has also recently designed a new "Competency Development Guide" to replace the current student log/action plan instrument. McBer is currently testing and validating the "Navy Competency Assessment Profile," a test intended to measure effectiveness of LMET training on individual performance. Both instruments are available in the draft version only pending further testing, revision, and approval for use in the LMET schools. The third subject for evaluation, impact on Navy organizational performance indicators, has not been measured to date. Indeed, this objective would be virtually impossible to realize when only a minority of Navy leaders have attended LMET. An experiment utilizing a small sample would introduce questions of the ability to generalize to the population. Finally, there is the difficulty of isolating LMET as a causative factor, even if a high positive correlation between LMET graduates and organizational performance could be demonstrated.

All of these evaluations were confined to specific areas of scrutiny. These initial efforts were also conducted by those deeply involved in the Navy's LMET program who hold a personal interest in its continued funding and expansion. The first study of LMET by an independent observer was D.F. Parker's thesis, Leadership Training in the Navy. This research, conducted in 1979 and 1980, is of limited value

because the LMET program was too recently established to allow a meaningful assessment of its effectiveness. Parker, however, did question the rigor of the research methodology employed by McBer and Company, specifically the coding process and the small sample size (Parker, 1980).

The next evaluation effort was conducted and described by Vandover and Villarosa in their 1981 thesis, LMET Effectiveness: A Pilot Study for Evaluation. The purpose of this study was twofold: to assess the usefulness of the pilot study method to measure LMET program effectiveness, and to identify issues of concern and formulate some initial hypotheses to guide later research. The authors stressed that their study was a "preliminary step to overall program evaluation to determine relevant issues and investigate a methodology to confront them" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981). They cited three primary needs for a broader evaluation: to ascertain if the Navy's investment in manpower and money is warranted, to provide LMET program managers with feedback regarding specific strengths and weaknesses, and to encourage a pro-active approach toward the management of the LMET program in the Navy. Although the authors agreed "there are few clear cut effectiveness indicators, no impeccable standards, and no completely reliable method of measuring effectiveness," they concluded that the pilot study was "an effective means of gathering data concerning non-quantifiable, behavioral-oriented [sic] responses" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 124).

The Vandover and Villarosa study concluded with the question with which this study commenced. Specifically, they stated,

The important issue that remains to be determined is: does LMET school improve leadership/management behaviors, hence increase managerial performance?... There appears to be a definite [sic] need for further evaluation on this subject, to determine if LMET training alone can bring about managerial behavior change or improvement resulting in increased performance. If LMET School itself is not sufficient, what if any additional support is needed?

(Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 129-130)

Their research indicated some initial findings of particular relevance to this study. Among the 51 individuals interviewed in the course of research, "there were no systematic behavioral changes that ran across the sample. However, there were isolated behavioral changes which were clearly the result of LMET training" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 88). The authors also noted a dichotomy between the individual's own perception of behavioral change as a result of LMET and change validated by the individual's superior and subordinates. "About one-fourth of all graduates believe they have changed yet this change is not validated.... Behavioral change as a specific result of LMET School is not at all assured" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, pp. 103-104).

Other findings pertinent to the present study regarding means of effecting and reinforcing behavioral change were also cited. The Vandover and Villarosa study indicated that the student journal was not an effective means of reinforcement; "only 27% of the sample actually used the journal

as a reference or guide to a problem they were encountering" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 113). Other issues of concern indicated by the findings were listed:

Communication Aspects of Rewarding and Disciplining

The Setting of Goals and Performance Standards

Feedback Concerning Performance

Finally, the study touched upon the effect of the general command climate on the LMET graduates' performance. No clear response pattern emerged from the sample surveyed, but the organization's effectiveness, especially in the realm of communication, appeared to be an influential factor on the behavior of the LMET graduates. The authors were reluctant to draw any conclusion from the data available. However, they stated that "it may...indicate a strong need for external support mechanisms in order for LMET to succeed" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 114).

#### E. OTHER THEORETICAL MODELS: THE JANUS APPROACH

Alice laughed, "One can't believe impossible things." I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."

(Carroll, 1862)

##### 1. The Dialectic of Ontology

The thesis of this work to this point has been that McClelland's theories, as reflected in LMET, embody in a very attractive form certain values in our society, specifically belief in the efficacy of individual initiative,

rational analysis, and the efficacy of technology. Perhaps, it would be enlightening at this point to review a diverse body of literature representing the "humanist" theme in organizational theory and focusing on the processes of acquiring and modifying perceptions of reality.

Martin Heidegger's essay "Being and Time" is considered to be a seminal work which has influenced both the existentialist movement and systems theory of organization. In an extremely abstract, densely textured essay, Heidegger investigated the provenance and purpose of human existence and human knowledge. In a sense, his essay was the philosophical equivalent of a theory of motivation and learning. In addressing the role of science, he stressed the importance of the process:

The importance of the research always lies in the establishment of concepts, its true progress comes about not so much in collecting results and storing them in "handbooks" as in being forced to ask questions about the basic constitution of each area, these questions being chiefly a reaction to increasing knowledge in each area.

The real "movement" of the sciences takes place in the revision of these basic concepts, a revision which is more or less radical and lucid with regard to itself. A science's level of development is determined by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In these immanent crises of the sciences the relation of positive questioning to the matter in question becomes unstable. Today tendencies to place research on new foundations have cropped up on all sides in the various disciplines.

(Heidegger, 1927)

In his essay "What Calls for Thinking?", Heidegger elaborated his contention that in the quest for knowledge,



the individual tests the upper and lower limits of his own unique equation in relation to his environment:

This is why we are here attempting to learn thinking. We are all on the way together, and are not reproving each other. To learn means to make everything we do answer to whatever addresses us as essential. Depending on the kind of essentials, depending on the realm from which they address us, the answer and with it the kind of learning differs.

A cabinetmaker's apprentice, someone who is learning to build cabinets and the like, will serve as an example. His learning is not mere practice, to gain facility in the use of tools. Nor does he merely gather knowledge about the customary forms of the things he is to build. If he is to become a true cabinetmaker, he makes himself answer and respond above all to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood--to wood as it enters into man's dwelling with all the hidden riches of its nature. In fact, this relatedness to wood is what maintains the whole craft. Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything but empty busywork, any occupation with it will be determined exclusively by business concerns. Every handicraft, all human dealings, are constantly in that danger.

(Heidegger, 1954)

Emile Durkheim addressed the problem adjusting to the imperatives of large organizations in a fragmented, industrialized society in The Division of Labor in Society. He first coined the term anomie as a symptom of the stress reduced by the loss of a sense of community. He concluded that:

the remedy for the evil is not to seek to resuscitate traditions and practices which, no longer responding to present conditions of society, can only live an artificial, false existence. What we must do to relieve this anomie is to discover the means for taking the organs which are still wasting themselves in discordant movements harmoniously concur by introducing

into their relations more justice by more and more extenuating the external inequalities which are the source of the evil.

Because certain of our duties are no longer founded in the reality of things, a breakdown has resulted which will be repaired only in so far as a new discipline is established and consolidated. In short, our first duty is to make a moral code for ourselves. Such a work cannot be improvised in the silence of the study; it can arise only through itself, little by little, under the pressure of internal causes which make it necessary.

(Durkheim, 1893)

Weber, in his controversial study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalization, also noted this multiplicity of perspectives and the limitations of rationalism in his investigation of the need for achievement:

This sample proposition, which is often forgotten, should be placed at the beginning of every study which essays to deal with rationalism [one may] rationalize life from fundamentally different basic points of view and in very different directions. Rationalism is an historical concept which covers a whole world of different things....We are here particularly interested in the origin of precisely the irrational element which lies in this...conception of a calling.

(Weber, 1921)

Ferdinand Tonnies addressed this contrast in his study "Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft" to differentiate between the group that is held together by common ties of feeling and the organization that integrates roles around instrumental objectives" (March and Simon, ?).

In another early work, T.N. Whitehead addressed the relationship of the information organization within the formal organization. Leadership in a free society noted the

pervasive influence of informal groups and their demonstrated flexibility and efficiency in response to change when unimpeded by the formal organization. Whitehead concluded:

No society or organization is adverse to change, provided the initiative for that change takes place at the relevant level--at that level where the daily activities have shown the need. Under those conditions, change will present itself not as an interruption, but as the natural flow of social living.

(Whitehead, 1936)

Berger and Luckmann, in their well-known book, The Social Construction of Reality, examined the sociology of knowledge. Expanding on Heidegger's thesis that the individual defines himself and his universe through an ontological quest, the authors conducted a sociological analysis of "the knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Their study is divided into objective and subjective reality. They formulated a central paradox common to the studies cited herein:

The institutional world is objectivated human activity, and so is every single institution. In other words, despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it. The paradox [is] that man is capable of producing a world that he then experiences as something other than a human product....The relationship ...remains a dialectical one...externalization and objectification...then internalization.

(Berger and Luckmann, 1966)

In discussing society as subjective reality, the authors address the barriers to secondary socialization, a subject central to an evaluation of the effectiveness of current LMET courses. They conclude:

The fact that the processes of secondary socialization do not presuppose a high degree of identification and its contents do not possess the quality of inevitability can be pragmatically useful because they permit learning sequences that are rational and emotionally controlled. But because the contents of this type of internalization have a brittle and unreliable subjective reality compared to the internalizations of primary socialization, in some cases special techniques must be developed to produce whatever identification and inevitability are deemed necessary....A professional revolutionary... needs an immeasurably higher degree of identification and inevitability than an engineer....Secondary socialization becomes affectively changed to the degree to which immersion in and commitment to the new reality are institutionally defined as necessary....An important circumstance that may posit the need for such intensification is competition between the reality defining personnel of various institutions.

(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 132-133)

A consequence of "a society in which discrepant worlds are available," they note, is "that one's own institutionalized conduct may be apprehended as 'a role' from which one may detach oneself....Individuals...play at what they are supposed to be" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 158).

In Beyond Culture, Edward T. Hall scrutinized similar issues of the process of learning and Weltanschauung from an anthropological perspective:

In his strivings for order, Western man has created chaos by denying that part of his self that integrates while enshrining the parts that fragment experience....The natural act of thinking is greatly modified by culture; Western man uses only a small fraction of his mental capabilities; there are many different and legitimate ways of thinking; we in the West value one of these ways above all others--the one we call "logic," a linear system that has been with us since Socrates. Western man sees his system

of logic as synonymous with truth. For him it is the only road to reality.

(Hall, 1976, p. 1)

Hall sets forth six principles to advance his thesis:

1. An individual cannot through introspection and self-examination understand himself or the forces that mold his life, without understanding his culture.
2. Cultures won't change unless everyone changes.
3. Cultures is dictatorial unless understood and examined.
4. It is not that Man must be in sync with, or adapt to his culture, but that cultures grow out of sync with Man. When this happens, people go crazy and they don't know it.
5. In order to avoid mass insanity people must learn to transcend and adapt their culture to the times and to their biological organisms.
6. To accomplish this task, since introspection tells you nothing, man needs the experience of other cultures, i.e., to survive, all cultures need each other.

(Hall, 1976, pp. 282-283)

Failure to examine one's own perceptions of reality, Hall contends, results in the continuation of several kinds of irrationality: situational, contextual, neurotic, institutional, and cultural (Hall, 1976, pp. 282-283).

Garrett Hardin explored the social consequences of the failure to question basic assumptions of Western industrial societies in his famous essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons." Again, this work carries implications regarding the effectiveness of LMET. Hardin defined a technical

solution as "one that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality" (Hardin, 1968).

Hardin averred that many human problems do not admit a technical solution. Instead, they require a re-examination of the concept of individual freedom, "a fundamental extension in morality" (Hardin, 1968). Failure to question basic assumptions will result in the tragedy of the commons, a remorseless and inevitable decline from which escape is futile.

Hardin believed that an appeal to conscience was useless if unrewarded. He cited Gregory Bateson's concept of the double-bind dilemma:

Sooner or later [the individual], consciously or subconsciously, senses that he has received two communications, and that they are contradictory: (1) [intended communication] "If you don't do as we ask, we will openly condemn you for not acting like a responsible citizen;" (2) [the unintended communication] "If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons.

(Hardin, 1968)

Hardin concluded that the only solution to these problems was in "mutual coercion." He did not pretend that this was desirable, only necessary to continued existence.

## 2. Systems Theory Models

Several notable figures in the field of cybernetics have drawn heavily on theoretical works discussing the dialectic of ontology. Borrowing by analogy the open systems

framework from the natural sciences, they have constructed a systems theory of organizations. Central to this theory is the focus on organizational change and its relationship with individuals and the environment. Etzioni advocated a systems model rather than a goal model for organizations because it encouraged more realistic expectations for inducing change (Etzioni, 1960).

Katz and Kahn described several characteristics of organizations based on their systems model. They stressed that the interrelationships, the action at the boundaries, served to define the organization and effect change. Perhaps their most interesting contribution was the concept of equifinality: there does not have to be a single method for achieving an objective. James Thompson, in "Organizations in Action," drew on Heidegger's ontological model in stating "the organization must develop processes for searching and learning as well as deciding....It must set limits to its definition of situations; it must make decisions in bounded rationality."

Burns and Stalker, in "Mechanistic and Organic Systems" concluded that organic systems operating in a rapidly changing environment, placed much heavier demands on the individuals in the organization to perform.

The only way "his" job can be done is by his participating continually with others in the solution of problems which are real to the form, and put in a language of requirements and activities meaningful to them all.

(Burns and Stalker, 1966)

### 3. Training Managers for Organizational Change

Alternative proposals for training leaders to cope with a rapidly changing technology and environment have been set forth. William B. Eddy in "From Training to Organization Change," contended that training and change efforts must go hand in hand with an emphasis on process rather than goals. He believed that neither effort could be successful implemented alone.

Fiedler specifically addressed the quotation of leadership training in the military in "How Do You Make Leaders More Effective?" He called for an analysis of "situational favorableness," and maintained that changing the job is more efficient than attempts to change the individual (Fiedler, 1972).

French and Bell contended that leaders could be improved through use of organizational development techniques to enhance "problem-solving and renewal processes" (French and Bell, 1972).

#### F. STATUS OF THE NAVY HRM PROGRAM: 1975-1982

The history of LMET and the rest of the Navy's Human Resources Management activities has been one of separate development. Little interaction, cooperation, or even exchange of ideas has been evident since the LMET schools were established as independent commands. One explanation proffered is that those involved in the LMET program desired



to avoid at the outset the negative attitudes often directed at the Human Resources Management System in general.

The HRM program was still suffering from antagonism to its efforts generated by the sweeping organizational changes directed during the Zumwalt era. The history of the HRM program after 1974 could be viewed as an illustration of Machiavelli's famous warning to those who would be agents of change:

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favor; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attacking the reformer, his opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend him half-heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger.

(Machiavelli, 1513)

Since 1975, the HRM community has continued to stress professionalism and dedication of its activities to the improved readiness of operational units. Simultaneously, it has suffered periodic cuts in funding and manpower. The imperative to eradicate a generally negative (and unfair) image, coupled with chronic resource constraints, have served to hinder the Human Resources Management System's effectiveness as agents of organizational change. One encouraging trend, however, has been the increased practice of organizational development techniques and a corresponding de-emphasis on the lock-step pattern of the

Human Resources Availability (HRAV) cycle. Despite these efforts, only in isolated commands has the HRM community shared the generally favorable response that the LMET program has elicited.

### III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this study entailed the author's participation in two discrete research projects investigating actual use of LMET competencies in Navy commands. Both projects included a large number of researchers and were led by senior individuals. For these responses, the author was not in a position to make final decisions regarding research design. This lack of autonomy was far outweighed by the advantages of participation in these research projects: availability of funding and administrative support; logistic support; training by McBer personnel in interview techniques; and the capacity to interview and analyze a significantly larger sample than the author could have done individually. Finally, the opportunity to work with individuals of the highest academic and professional calibre in both research projects was the overriding consideration in choosing to participate in a group project.

#### A. NAVY POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL RESEARCH PROJECT

##### 1. Background and Design Considerations

NMD-6 had expressed an interest in studying what competencies are demonstrated by superior leaders of heterogeneous work groups. Do they employ heretofore unidentified competencies? Does the frequency of their use of the 16 fleet competencies differ from that exhibited by leaders of homogeneous

work groups? These issues had been discussed with McBer personnel as areas warranting further research. In the interest of cost-effectiveness, the decision was made to conduct this research utilizing Navy personnel at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey. The advantages to the Navy of this avenue of research were clear: the research costs were projected to be less than ten percent of line costs of contracting the research with McBer. Moreover, NPS personnel had expressed an interest in such a project. The assets were available; the school's Organizational Development curriculum was among the most highly regarded in the nation. Moreover, they were knowledgeable about the Navy.

The contract was approved in late 1981, and the research group was formed in January, 1982. The research project manager was an NPS professor. A full-time researcher and a research/administrative assistant were hired to direct the daily research progress. Seven NPS students in the Organizational Development curriculum volunteered to participate in the six month research project.

At the outset, all seven graduate students intended to utilize the data gathered through the research project in the preparation of their respective theses. The students submitted their proposed topics to the researchers who incorporated questions in the demographic survey to enable the students to utilize the basic data for their particular purposes later on. For example, for the purposes of this particular

study, all interview subjects indicated whether or not they were LMET graduates and the billet level and completion date of their courses.

Since this research project was specifically studying LMET competencies and designed as a follow-on project to the original McBer and Company research, it utilized the same methodology that the original LMET study employed.

## 2. The Sample

Research sites included San Diego, the San Francisco Bay area, and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. These locations were selected primarily because time and funding constraints did not allow a broader study. However, since all three areas were fleet concentration points, many commands remained available for study. Local Human Resources Management specialists were contacted in each geographic area to suggest commands containing heterogeneous work groups. HRM specialists also provided information regarding the general command climate for each unit. These individuals were utilized for this information because they were knowledgeable about the various commands, yet they retained a certain measure of independent judgment.

Following the example of the McBer methodology, a combination of quota and purposive sampling was utilized. That is, approximately equal numbers of superior and average performers were selected by their commanding officers to be the interview subjects. Quota sampling was maintained by

choosing approximately equal numbers of commands in the surface fleet, aviation, and shore establishments. Quota sampling was also used to select approximately equal numbers of LMET and non-LMET graduates. Quota sampling again was employed to obtain approximately equal numbers of interview subjects representing four different billet ascension levels: Leading Petty Officer, Leading Chief Petty Officer, Division Officer, and Department Heads. The researchers also specifically requested the commanding officers to include some minority and female personnel among those selected as interview subjects. Again, this request introduced an element of purposive sampling. However, the majority of the interview subjects, both superior and average, were white males. During the progress of the research, the group was requested to interview members of the "Women at Sea" program. For this reason, an unusually large number of the female subjects were assigned to fleet units, possibly showing this element of the sample. A total of 134 subjects were interviewed, and 93 were later used in the statistical analysis.

The sample differences between the McBer research project and this one are as follows:

1. All NPS interviews were conducted within the Pacific Fleet.
2. NPS interviews included members of the shore establishment. McBer interviews were restricted to personnel from fleet units.
3. McBer interviews proportionately represented members of the submarine, aviation, and surface warfare communities; the NPS project did not

interview any individuals currently assigned to submarines due to the relatively heterogeneous nature of their crews.

4. NPS interviews included a significantly higher percentage of female and minority members.
5. All NPS interviews were conducted in the blind; only the Atlantic Fleet interviews were blind in the McBer project.
6. No individual was interviewed by both research groups.
7. In the NPS project, the size of the work groups and the number of interview subjects varied at each site due to the schedules of the participants and the work requirements of the commands.
8. During the NPS research, the designation of superior and average performers occasionally was made by the executive officer or immediate superior rather than by the commanding officer.
9. Some commanding officers provided unequal numbers of interview subjects designated superior and average.
10. One command designated the interview subjects selected as "good" and "bad" performers.

### 3. Behavioral Event Interviews

#### a. Training

Prior to the commencement of the data gathering phase, the NPS research group received training in how to conduct the behavioral event interviews. The training was conducted by an individual from McBer and Company during an intensive two day seminar titled "The Interviewing for Competence Workshop." The NPS group members then completed additional practice interviews which were sent to McBer and Company for a formal critique and certification.

b. Purpose

The behavioral event interview, following McBer's methodology, was to be the primary information source from which the competencies would be identified. The focus of the behavioral event interview is "on what it takes to do a given job well" (McClelland, 1978). Meanwhile, behavioral indicators are stressed in order to provide the empirical data from which the initial hypotheses can be generalized.

c. Technique

Each behavioral event interview normally lasts one and one-half to two hours. All interviews were tape recorded, with the subject's permission, and conducted in private. At the outset of the interview, all subjects were assured that absolute confidentiality would be preserved and that remarks could be erased if the subject so desired. The purpose of the research project was briefly explained. The subjects were informed that they were selected because they were members of a heterogeneous or "mixed" work group. The interviewers carefully provided any implication regarding the quality of the subject's performance in order to avoid biasing the interview.

The interviews commenced with some general questions regarding the nature of the subject's work groups, the group's tasks, and the subject's individual duties and responsibilities. The ulterior purpose of these questions was to relax the subject, establish some degree of rapport, and to make



the subject forget about the tape recorder. The interviewer probed the subject and asked him to clarify anything that the interviewer did not understand. The purpose of the initial probes was to lead the subject naturally into a description of his first behavioral event, or critical incident. The subject was asked to describe the event in great detail.

McBer's methodology stipulated the following guidelines:

You should have in mind the following questions as the interviewee begins to tell the story:

1. What led up to the event?
2. What was the person thinking? (of the individual he or she was interacting with, of the situation.)
3. What did the person do, and why?
4. What was the person feeling, wishing?
5. How did it all turn out?

You are interested in the interviewee's:

1. Perceptions of the people and the situation.
2. Thoughts.
3. Acts.
4. Feelings.
5. Conclusions for future reference.

(McClelland, 1978)

After the first behavioral event, the subject was requested to describe additional events in the same manner. The interviewers aimed to collect a total of six complete incidents from each subject, preferably three descriptions of successful events and three narratives of events in which the subject felt unsuccessful. At this point in the interview, the research should have collected several detailed "vignettes or scenarios of things that happened to [the subject]"

(McClelland, 1978).

At the end of the interview, the subject was asked to describe the characteristics of a superior performer in his or her particular job. This exercise provided further insight into what the subject considers to be important. It also provides a means to compare and contrast the subject's conceptualization of the desired traits with the subject's own behaviors as illustrated in the behavioral events. Table 10, excerpted from McBer's "Interviewing for Competency Workshop" provides a quick summary of the behavioral event interview objectives and process as designed by McClelland. Table 11, immediately following, is excerpted from the same workshop. It specifies problems that commonly occur during the interview process and suggests methods for the interviewer to overcome them.

d. Advantages of the Behavioral Event  
Interview Methodology

The behavioral event interview aims to avoid the danger of research bias posed by a structured question format. By utilizing a structured probe strategy, the interview elicits the most significant job experiences as seen by the interview subject, rather than those imposed by the interviewer. The interview technique is designed to be investigative rather than reflective, that is, it's consistent focus is on determining what the narrator actually did. It determinedly avoids analytical, reflective, hypothetical, and leading questions. For this reason, the interviewer is trained to probe for descriptions of actual behaviors:

TABLE 10  
COMPONENTS OF THE BEI

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1. Introduction

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<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To establish an informal, friendly tone	Begin with small talk (about the weather, office, etc.).
To establish the interviewee's trust in the interviewer and in the confidentiality of the interview	Tell how the information will be used.  Request permission to use a tape recorder and to take notes.  Start tape-recording and taking notes.
To establish understanding in the interviewee of the interview in the context of the study or need	Say: "I need to talk to the real expert about the job and the kinds of situations you run into, because..."
To create understanding in the interviewee of the format of the interview and your role in the process	Establish the interview time frame.  Outline the components of the interview.

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1.a Optional Component: Career Path

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<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To form a picture of the interviewee's career path and goals, and the critical steps in the path	Ask the interviewee for: -- educational background, -- major jobs held, and their responsibilities, -- major transitions in the career, and -- key learning in different jobs.

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TABLE 10 (Cont'd)

To focus the interviewee on talking about himself or herself	Search for a moderate degree of detail, concentrating on concrete descriptions.
To make a transition from interviewee's past into the present (or future) job	Say: "May we talk now about some specific situation from your past that you believe has been helpful to you in your present (future) job?"

## 2. Description of Duties and Responsibilities

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To get an overview of the interviewee's job, with the interviewee giving specific information (listen for mention of or allusion to critical incidents to which you can return later)	Keep it brief (15-20 minutes). Ask for present job title. Ask: "Who reports to you, and to whom do you report?" Ask for major responsibilities: "What do you do in a particular day or week?"
To be clear about how the person spends time: on what specific activities	Search for a moderate amount of detail.
To train the interviewee to focus on specifics	Say: "Could you give me an example?" Ask the interviewee to clarify buzzwords and generalizations (e.g., "supervising," "develop a sales plan").
To provide a clear transition from this job overview to the first critical incident, or "behavioral event"	Say: "May we talk now about some specific situation you've encountered on the job?"

TABLE 10 (Cont'd)

## 3. First Behavioral Event

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To provide guidelines for the kind of information sought (it can be technical or non-technical)	<p>Say: "Can you think of a time or a situation on this job..."</p> <p>-- when things were particularly effective?"</p> <p>-- that you felt was a high point?"</p> <p>-- when you were satisfied?"</p>
To get as clear and detailed an account as possible	<p>Get the <u>total</u> situation. Ask:</p> <p>-- "Who was involved?"</p> <p>-- "What did you think, feel, want to do?"</p> <p>-- "What did you do or say?"</p> <p>-- "What was the outcome?"</p> <p>-- "How did you feel about the outcome?"</p>
To get a time sequence, and to train the interviewee to tell the story in the greatest possible detail	<p>Say:</p> <p>-- "Could you walk me through this situation from the beginning?"</p> <p>-- "What happened first?"</p>
To encourage the interviewee to volunteer another behavioral event: a critical incident or situation	<p>Say:</p> <p>-- "That's exactly what I'm looking for."</p> <p>-- "Can you think of another such time or situation?"</p>

TABLE 10 (Cont'd)

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4. Additional Behavioral Events

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<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To get two to three descriptions of effective and two to three descriptions of ineffective behavior	<p>To obtain descriptions of less effective behavior, say, "Can you think of a time when...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- you weren't satisfied?"</li> <li>-- you wished things had turned out differently?"</li> <li>-- things didn't go so well?"</li> <li>-- you had some problems?"</li> <li>-- you were really frustrated?"</li> </ul>
Again, to get as clear and detailed an account of the events as possible	Ask questions to obtain a complete understanding of the situation, including the time sequence.
To form a transition from this component to the final questions of the interview	Say: "May we wrap up now with a few final questions?"...

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5. Performer Characteristics

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<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To obtain a list of abilities, traits, and kinds of knowledge that the interviewee feels are important to perform his or her job	<p>Say:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- "If you were hiring someone to do your job, what do you think he or she would have to be able to do?"</li> <li>-- "What abilities, knowledge, or other characteristics would you look for?"</li> </ul>
To use this process to generate additional specific examples of events in areas that you may have overlooked	Say: "Can you give me an example of a time when having that knowledge/ability/characteristic was particularly important to you?"

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TABLE 10 (Cont'd)

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6. Summary and Interpretation

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<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Process</u>
To make a complete record of the interview, including the information in your notes	As soon as possible after the interview, use the Interview Form to record crucial data.

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TABLE 11

## INTERVIEW PROBLEMS AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM

## 1. Introduction

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible ways to handle</u>
Interviewee acts nervous or uncertain about why he or she is being interviewed.	<p>Say: "We're trying to understand what it takes to do jobs like yours. We'll be talking to a number of people, because we want to represent as many different experiences as we can."</p> <p>or: "Only you are the expert at what it takes to do your job."</p>
Interviewee seems uncomfortable with the use of a tape recorder.	<p>Say: "I just need it to help me with my notes."</p> <p>or: "If there is anything you want off the record, I'll turn it off. It's really up to you. But remember that everything you say will be kept in confidence."</p>

## 2. Description of Duties and Responsibilities

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible ways to handle</u>
Interviewee begins listing too many responsibilities or tasks.	Ask the interviewee to choose one of the most important responsibilities or tasks and give a recent example of when he or she carried it out.



TABLE 11 (Cont'd)

### 3. First Behavioral Event

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible ways to handle</u>
INTERVIEWER asks questions that are too complicated, or has trouble thinking of appropriate questions.	Keep your questions simple. Say: "How?" "When?" "Who?" "Then what happened?" "What did you do?"
INTERVIEWER probes for detail too soon, or cannot seem to find a thread for a behavioral event.	First let the interviewee give you a broad picture of the story. <u>Then</u> probe for details about the key part of the event.
Interviewee is giving too much information, too fast, or is scattered in giving you information.	Say: "I'd like you to slow down a bit. Could you go back to...?" or: "I'm not sure I understand that sequence. Could you walk me through it?"
Interviewee says he or she can't remember the actual words in a conversation.	Say: "Just give me the flavor of it. What sort of thing did you say?" "Try to reconstruct the dialogue right now to describe your memory of what happened. Make believe I'm the person you were talking to."

### 4. Additional Behavioral Events

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible ways to handle</u>
Interviewee cannot remember a specific incident.	Say: "Is there anything else you do on your job?" or: "Was there anything else you did during that time?" or: "Earlier you mentioned..." Remain silent.

TABLE 11 (Cont'd)

Interviewee seems uncomfortable.

Tell about an experience of your own in behavioral-event story form, to illustrate the kind of material you want.

Reward the interviewee whenever he or she provides a good behavioral event: say, "That's exactly the kind of information I'm looking for."

Vagueness: interviewee talks of the philosophy of doing the job and remains abstract or discusses hypothetical situations.

Ask for specific examples:

-- "What did you actually say to him or her?"

-- "How did he or she respond to that?"

-- "What did you say then?"

Reticence: the interviewee is evasive or refuses to answer questions because he or she is concerned about revealing confidential material about himself, herself, or others.

Say: "I don't need any names. Just tell me what happened."

or: "It's O.K. to disguise the organization and people's names. I'm only interested in what happened and your part in it."

#### THINGS TO REMEMBER WHILE INTERVIEWING FOR COMPETENCE

##### Try to...

ask clarifying questions.

reward the interviewee for providing information you need.

stay with one situation.

get a complete picture of the job as performed by the interviewee.

##### Try not to...

accept generalizations.

let too much time pass when you are not getting specific information.

allow the interviewee to change the topic until you have a complete behavioral event.

test out your ideas about what the job is, or how it should be done.

TABLE 11 (Cont'd)

Try to...	Try not to...
elicit very detailed behavioral descriptions of how the person does the job.	ask leading questions or cross-examine the interviewee.
let the interview flow as long as the interviewee is "on track."	summarize, paraphrase, or leap to conclusions.
fill all the gaps in the narrative by eliciting the needed data from the interviewee.	assume you know what is happening, or who is involved, unless this has been specifically stated by the interviewee.
take complete notes, so that you could, if necessary, reconstruct the interview from notes alone.	rely on the tape recorder. It could fail.

Reference:  
McBer and Company

thoughts, conversations, and actions. The behavioral event interview aims to remove the subject's own perceptual filter, his thoughts and values, to determine the actual motives, abilities, and knowledge demonstrated in the course of their work. Additionally, the behavioral event interview seeks to concentrate on the most critical skills for job success. In McClelland's estimate, this methodology pinpoints "the ten percent of the behaviors that make ninety percent of the difference" (McBer, 1981).

One of the significant features of this technique is its inclusiveness; it seeks to specify both social and technical knowledge and skills deemed critical to superior performance. The technique claims to avoid a priori limits on job competencies. In short, the behavioral event interview provides a vehicle to remove the biases of both the interviewer and the interviewee to promote untainted empirical research. For this reason, an inclusive working definition of a job competency is viewed by McClelland as a key feature of the behavioral event interview technique. Some of the characteristics of a competency are described as follows:

- It can be an individual piece of knowledge, an ability, a trait, a self-image, or a motive.
- It is generic: it underlies and defines patterns in an individual's observable behavior on the job.
- It is causally related to superior performance in a job.

- It enables the individual to perform the required job functions better than an individual who does not possess the competency.

(McBer, 1981)

For these reasons, McClelland claims that the behavioral event interview produces significantly more accurate data in this particular field of inquiry.

#### 4. The Interview Experience

After the members of the NPS research group had participated in McBer's interview training and completed their certification tapes, they began the data collection phase. After consultation with local Human Resources Management personnel, either the research program manager or one of the paid researchers contacted likely commands by telephone. Every effort was made to speak directly to the respective commanding officers to explain the nature of the project and to solicit his personal assistance and support. If the commanding officer agreed to host the research group, then the researchers conducted further business with the executive officers and cognizant department heads. Verbal communications regarding the proposed interviews were followed up by form letters delineating the purpose of the research project, the nature of the research group, the importance of the venture to future LMET course design, good specific requirements for the interviews. These letters were designed for ready incorporation as enclosures to a command notice informing command members of the researcher's visit. The time, date,

space, and duration requirements, and criteria and confidentiality in selection of interview subjects were specified in a separate enclosure for the use of the commanding officers.

a. General Procedures

The researchers received in advance of most visits an interview schedule listing date, time, interviewer, assigned interviewee, the designated interview code number for the tape, and the office number of the private interview space. The vast majority of interviews were conducted weekly on Thursdays or Fridays from January through May 1981. This schedule was designed for the mutual convenience of the Navy commands and the research group.

Researchers generally travelled as a group and always convened prior to entering the environs of any command studied. Researchers wore civilian clothes since the research group itself was extremely heterogeneous, being comprised of Army and Navy graduate students of different ranks, a professor who was also a retired officer, and two civilians completely unfamiliar with the military. It was agreed, however, to be forthright with the interview subjects regarding the identity and status of the interviewers.

The research group met briefly with the commanding officer and executive officer of each unit prior to commencement of the interviews. Interest in the findings of the research project and a generally favorable reaction to the Navy's LMET program were commonly expressed during these

meetings. At this time, the commanding officer's designation of the selected interview subjects as "superior" or "average" was handed to one of the researchers in a sealed envelope to prevent biasing the interviewers. The interviewers were then introduced to their subjects and escorted to the respective private interview spaces.

The research group provided all required equipment and forms. Table 12 represents a form used by the interviewer to facilitate notetaking. Table 13 was completed by each interviewee to provide demographic data for later statistical analysis. Table 14 was also completed by the interviewee to provide a concise summary of the mission, size, and heterogeneity of the interviewee's work group. All interviews were tape recorded by the interviewer for later transcription. The tapes were augmented by the interviewer's notes regarding the behavior of each subject. At the conclusion of each interview, the research group reconvened at a previously specified location for a short de-brief with the commanding officer. The content of the interviews was never discussed; instead, the purpose was a matter of courtesy and to gain further insight into aspects of the command climate which might affect the employment of job competencies.

#### b. Difficulties Encountered

Although the general description of the information collection experience to this point has implied that it was a smooth, well-ordered process, there were many exceptions to this norm. Some of the surprises and difficulties encountered

TABLE 12

BEI CRIB SHEET

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose: Interview to be used in a study to develop a competency model for managers of diverse (heterogeneous) work groups.
2. Use of Model: training
3. Length of Interview: 1 1/2--2 hours
4. Why you: You are (or have been) a manager of a heterogeneous work group; you're an expert in what it takes to do the job.
5. Outline Interview Process: a) Describe general information concerning job and major responsibilities. b) Then you'll be asked to describe key situations (critical incidents) in which you felt effective or not so effective as manager of heterogeneous work group. c) You'll be asked to given an overview of the situation--then I will probe for specifics.
6. Confidentiality: Data are confidential and only used for research purposes. Individual remains anonymous.
7. Why tape recorder: to assist in note taking (get permission)

INTERVIEW PROCESS

(Ask for completed info form)

1. Name:
2. Job Title:
3. Division:
4. How long in job: Quick summary of career to date
5. Whom you report to:



TABLE 12 (Cont'd)

6. Who reports to you:

- a) Break out of diverse work group (# Minorities, Women, civilian/military, etc.)
- b) Any other factors leading to group's diversity?

7. Major duties and responsibilities

Behavioral Events: Describe events where you felt effective or not so effective in managing a heterogeneous work group.

For each you'll be asked to:

- Give a brief general overview of situation
- What led up to the situation?
- Who was involved?
- What were you thinking and feeling?
- What did you do?
- What did others think/feel/do?
- What was the outcome?
- How did you feel about the outcome?

\* (Be especially alert to probe for behaviors, attitudes, thoughts and feelings of subject as well as people in work group to discover cross-cultural dynamics)

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

- What would you look for if you were going to hire someone to be a manager of a heterogeneous work group? (Or what would you train someone to do?)

Reference:

Excerpted from research interview of NPS study

TABLE 13

## INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION SHEET

This information will provide demographic data for use in a study to develop a competency model for managers of heterogeneous work groups. All information is for research purposes only and is confidential. Please complete this form prior to the start of the interview.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Rank: \_\_\_\_\_

Job: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Sex: Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_ Place of birth: \_\_\_\_\_

Education level:

Some high school \_\_\_\_\_ High school graduate \_\_\_\_\_

Some college \_\_\_\_\_ Completed bachelor's degree \_\_\_\_\_

Graduate studies \_\_\_\_\_ Master's degree \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Are you an LMET graduate? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

What year? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you consider yourself:

Caucasian \_\_\_\_\_ Black \_\_\_\_\_

Hispanic \_\_\_\_\_ Filipino \_\_\_\_\_

Asian \_\_\_\_\_ Native American \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Reference:

Excerpted from research interview of NPS study

TABLE 14

BEI INTERVIEW FORM FOR MANAGERS  
OF HETEROGENEOUS WORK GROUPS

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Job: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Division: \_\_\_\_\_ Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Location of Interview: \_\_\_\_\_

How long in job: \_\_\_\_\_ years

Reports to: \_\_\_\_\_

People reporting to interviewee: \_\_\_\_\_

Breakout of heterogeneous work group, numbers of:

Women: \_\_\_\_\_ Filipinos: \_\_\_\_\_

Civilians: \_\_\_\_\_ Asians: \_\_\_\_\_

Civilians with prior military experience: \_\_\_\_\_

Blacks: \_\_\_\_\_ Others: \_\_\_\_\_

Hispanics: \_\_\_\_\_

Other factors contributing to group's heterogeneity: \_\_\_\_\_

Major duties and responsibilities: \_\_\_\_\_

TABLE 14 (Cont'd)

Titles of Behavioral Events:	High Point	or Low Point
1. _____	_____	_____
2. _____	_____	_____
3. _____	_____	_____
4. _____	_____	_____
5. _____	_____	_____
6. _____	_____	_____
7. _____	_____	_____
8. _____	_____	_____
9. _____	_____	_____
10. _____	_____	_____

Interviewer's Summary: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Reference:  
Excerpted from research interview of NPS study

by the research group are summarized below. The researchers quickly discovered that their technical competence in operating and performing minor repairs on their government-issue tape records was weak indeed. The author's tape recorder failed to operate at all at the commencement of her first interview. Her interviewee turned out to be an ideal subject in this instance, however. The individual was an Electronics Technician, and repaired the tape recorder on the spot. A seemingly minor, mechanical aspect of the information collection process proved to be fraught with hazards for researchers: tapes broke, adapters failed to adapt, batteries died at inauspicious moments, and different microphones demonstrated their individual eccentricities. Many difficulties with the quality of the tape recordings lay in the environment where the interviews were conducted. Operational Navy activities tend to be noisy places; tapes were punctuated by sounds of engine and fan vibrations, aircraft landings and take offs, jet engine tests, 1-MC announcements, ringing telephones, and clicking typewriters. Clearly, there was a discrepancy between interview training in the calm of academia and the interview experience in the real Navy. Private interview spaces were limited and haphazard, and no amount of cushions could deaden the extraneous sounds, much to the dismay of the transcriber. A certain number of otherwise valuable interviews were deleted for these reasons. Another tape recorder associated difficulty was discovered later; the transcriber's machine was not synchronized

with the interviewer's counters, making it extremely difficult for the transcriber to start at a specified point.

Although the tape recorder problem presented the largest class of difficulties during the interview experience, the researchers encountered other unanticipated obstacles. Occasionally, the host command failed to provide an interview assignment schedule, causing temporary coding difficulties. In several instances, last minute substitutions of interview subjects required the researchers to obtain additional data at a later point. The subjects frequently had difficulty completing the form illustrated in Table 14, especially regarding the definition of "the work group" and in describing the characteristics of its personnel. As found in previous studies, the interviewees frequently confused LMT courses with LMET courses. These minor hindrances were quickly overcome as the researchers began to anticipate them.

Space, privacy and confidentiality proved to be chronic problems, however, especially given the space limitations of Navy ships. Interviews at times necessarily were interrupted to respond to urgent operational needs or to allow others to enter their work and berthing spaces. One young officer returned from taking a shower after a mid-watch, only to find his stateroom occupied by the author and her interviewee. Other interviews literally were conducted in supply and janitorial closets, behind torpedo racks, and on avionics' work benches. The researchers themselves were at

times a hazard; those unfamiliar with Navy ship frame and compartment designation systems were known to become lost returning from the head.

Other minor difficulties centered around the selection of the interview subjects. It was not uncommon for the researchers to discover that the interviewees had been notified only shortly before the interview. Their lack of knowledge regarding the nature of the research or the duration of the interview, and the necessity for them to make last minute arrangements in their schedules, understandably hindered their enthusiasm for the project. Some subjects, even some superior performers, made poor interview subjects because they lacked facility with the language. The strong accents of others caused transcription difficulties. The interviewers' jargon-spiced vocabulary also caused problems. For example, one young petty officer confused the terms "heterogeneous" and "heterosexual." The researchers quickly learned to employ a less rarified vocabulary.

#### 5. Post-Interview Work

Shortly after the conclusion of each interview, the interviewer again reviewed the quality of the tape recording. The interviewer then completed the second half of the form exhibited in Table 14, expanding on the subject's duties and responsibilities in terms of job competencies. The Behavioral Events described by the subject were titled and listed, indicating whether each represented a high or low point. The

"Interviewer's Summary" provided a written narrative of the salient features of each incident in order to preserve the date if the tape should become lost or damaged. The interviewer employed the subject's own vocabulary as much as possible.

After completing the description of the behavioral events, the researcher would list the competencies evident in the interview and refer to specific examples.

The interviewer's summary and interpretative when done in a conscientious manner, provided additional data for later analysis. This portion provided the researcher the opportunity to record unobtrusive performance measures and qualitative observation. Significant or recurring themes were also noted for future reference. Some of the observation suggested by McBer for the researcher's attention included:

- (1) physical appearance of interviewee and his or her office (e.g., neat/messy)
- (2) conversational style of interviewee
- (3) words and phrases that interviewee used repeatedly
- (4) how interviewee made you feel (e.g., uncomfortable, relaxed), and what he or she was doing to have this effect
- (5) difficulty you had getting interviewee relaxes or able to talk about high and low points
- (6) way in which interviewee handled subordinates in your presence
- (7) kinds of materials interviewee pulled out for you to look at
- (8) interviewee's conclusions about events and people



- (9) how interviewee seems to handle different situations in similar ways
- (10) things that seem to be missing out of place in interviewee, in comparison with other people in same job whom you have interviewed.

(McBer and Company, 1981)

The researcher's next step in the post-interview work procedure was to listen to the entire tape and indicate on the Transcription information form, the beginning of each behavioral event. The post-interview work was an extremely time-consuming process.

#### 6. The Interview Coding Process

The interview transcripts were proofread by the interviewer for accuracy. Many Navy terms and acronyms were defined at this time for greater clarity. The interviewer then indicated whether he considered the subject a superior or average performer. Interview transcripts were then exchanged among the researchers. A second reader then indicated his impression of the interviewee's performance. The second reader also identified tentative themes that distinguished between the performance levels. Recurring subjects of behavioral events were also classified and filed at this time for the later use of the graduate students in their specific areas of inquiry. Particularly good examples of either themes or subjects were highlighted for future reference. The initial review provided a rough organization of the now extensive data and served to provide a verification of the commanding officers' judgment of the interviewees' performance.

The research group then participated in a two day competency identification conference. This process will not be described since its purpose lies outside the purview of this study. However, the specific code book and behavioral indicators that were used for the coding process were finalized during this conference. They represented a modification of the McBer LMET competencies. The primary difference between the two lists was that the NPS list contained some additional competencies.

During the coding process, the research group was divided into teams of two members each. Each team was responsible for coding twenty interview transcripts. Each member performed the primary coding for ten interviews and secondary coding for his partner's assigned interviews. The coding process entailed an initial reading of the entire interview, followed by detailed textual scrutiny. The primary coder then identified and labelled the code for each competency and behavioral indicator in the margin of the interview transcript. Upon completion of the primary coding, the partners exchanged transcripts. The secondary coding was performed in the blind. That is, the codes assigned by the primary coder on the left margin were covered to avoid biasing the secondary coder. Upon completion of the secondary coding process, the codes were compared. Although all coders had been drilled, the definitions of the various competencies and their behavioral indicators had received the same guidelines

regarding desired frequency of coding, they demonstrated widely discrepant results during the initial coding attempts. As coding partners reviewed the texts simultaneously and discussed their different judgments item by item in excruciating detail, they reached a consensus and attained a fair degree of reliability in their subsequent coding decisions. However, each two member team continued to exhibit radically different coding judgments, both in frequency and in labelling, throughout this phase. Independent personnel at a later date were assigned the task of providing inter-rater reliability among the coding teams. In the opinion of one individual responsible for inter-rater reliability, the process was "extremely dubious."<sup>1</sup>

Other factors which bring into question both the validity and the reliability of the codes include time constraints, interest of the coders, attention span of the coders, influence of one strong personality on his partner, and willingness to engage in debate regarding coding anomalies. It could be contended that the codes of the more influential or more interested partner tended to prevail, regardless of their validity. Similarly, the inter-rater reliability personnel could be viewed as exercising a disproportionate influence regarding the raw data used in statistical analysis.

After the coding process was completed, a total of 93 interviews, representing 406 behavioral events, were

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<sup>1</sup>LT L.J. Fraser, oral comment to author, October, 1982.

determined to be sufficiently useful for statistical analysis. The competency codesheet data was then transferred onto a master frequency of competency sheet. These tables served as the basis for the raw data entered into the Naval Postgraduate School computer.

#### 7. The Competency Analysis Process

Two of the researchers, supported by individuals in the computer systems curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, conducted the statistical analysis of the coded data gleaned from the behavioral event interviews. Each incident, or behavioral event, was defined as a case. These cases were then subgrouped under the categories of "interview" and "interviews of superior (or average) performers." The competencies were listed as variables. Various demographic features comprised the remaining variables. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was employed for statistical analysis. Frequencies of competency use were the primary measures of distinguishing superior from average performers. Then cross-tabs were performed to determine if the data demonstrated a statistically significant correlation between the various demographic variables and frequency of competency use. Various standard parametric and non-parametric statistical tests were performed on the data. Differences between LMET and non-LMET graduates, both among the class of superior performers and the aggregate of average performers, were tested. Tests regarding any correlation between command characteristics

and frequency of competency use were restricted to the three broad categories: surface, aviation, and shore establishments.

The author undertook a qualitative vs. quantitative assessment of the interview transcripts using the case study method to determine some effects of LMET training on individuals and command factors which affect the employment of LMET competencies. Although this case study approach utilized the same body of data that the statistical analysis employed, its methods were necessarily qualitative and subjective. However, the author viewed this methodology for analysis to be complementary to the statistical analysis performed by other members of the Naval Postgraduate School research group.

#### 8. Assessment of Methodology

In the judgment of the author, some review and assessment of the methodological approach as a whole is in order. Passing comments regarding possible strengths and weaknesses of specific activities have been offered when considered appropriate. The methodology, following the McBer model, was empirical in approach. Buckley and Chiang, in Research Methodology and Business Decisions, have presented a useful summary of these aspects of empirical research:

##### Strengths:

1. It is best suited to analyzing actual behavior.
2. It is best suited to fact-finding, to seeking reality.
3. With respect to case and field studies, it provides the richest context in which research can take place.
4. With respect to laboratory studies, it provides the most stringent controls under which research can take place.

5. Through observation, the researcher is required to enter the arena of research, to get involved.
6. Very advanced monitoring equipment can be used, as can sophisticated techniques such as gaming and simulation.

Deficiencies:

1. It is deficient with respect to analysis of the past or the future--it is limited to the present.
2. It requires the most time.
3. Only a relatively few situations can be studied (sample size), they must be proximate to the researcher, and the ability to generalize is greatly restricted.
4. With respect to observation:
  - (a) There are inherent deficiencies in the observer.
  - (b) Systematic biases attend the observational modes of participant or non-participant and obtrusive or unobtrusive.
  - (c) It is difficult to develop the skills of observation and to train others to do so.
  - (d) Observation itself can become an agent of change.
5. With respect to case and field studies, it is difficult to draw the parameters around the problem.
6. With respect to laboratory studies:
  - (a) Crucial variables may be excluded in the attempt to achieve clean experiments.
  - (b) There is bias inherent in the design and conduct of experiments. The researcher decides which questions of issues to explore and the context under which the responses are given.
  - (c) Subjects tend to role-play.
  - (d) Subjects are often imperfect surrogates for the principals they represent.
  - (e) Subjects' responses may be influenced by overt or covert hostility toward the researcher and/or the experiment.

(Buckley and Chiang, 1976, p. 45)

a. Issues Regarding the Small Sample Case Study Methodology

Because the dominant trend in behavioral science research has been toward more quantitative, scientifically rigorous work, perhaps special attention should be devoted

to justifying the author's approach. This study is viewed as being complementary to, not contrary to, statistical analysis methods. It is an attempt to illuminate other factors not captured in statistics. It is an attempt to see the story behind the statistics.

Textual analysis can also prevent the drawing of hasty conclusions concerning the direction of cause and effect in statistical correlations. For example, a high correlation could be demonstrated between females assigned to sea duty and those who are superior performers. A superficial review might conclude that assignment to sea duty improves the quality of performance of women in the Navy. However, the cause-effect direction might be the reverse: that superior female performers are more attracted to the challenges of a sea duty assignment and are thus more likely to be found in such billets. It is this type of information, the story behind the numerical correlations, which can be explored through case study analysis.

More persuasive arguments can be found in the literature which can be used to support this approach. In "Alternative Approaches to the Study of Complex Situations," Weiss suggested that analysis of complex situations may use either an analytic or a holistic approach. He contrasted these methods as follows:

What goes on in the mind of an investigator who, whenever he is asked to study a complex situation, thinks of survey research? He probably assumes that the task of research is to discover consistent relationships

between elements, that consistency can be demonstrated only within a large sample, that relationships can be established and evaluated only with reliable measures. The result is a survey. A holistic assumption, on the other hand, that the aim of research is to discover the organization of elements, would lead to different emphases and consequently to different research designs.

(Weiss, 1966, p. 201)

Since holistic research aims to preserve the nuances of many factors on the subject of inquiry, it demands data which reflects the complexity of the subject matter. "Only in this way can the investigator be assured that the data have within them a report on the functioning of each of the system's elements. This demand for density leads to the case study or small sample study as preferred research designs" (Weiss, 1968, p. 345).

Evered and Louis address similar methodological considerations, and the characteristics of each approach, labelling the paradigms "inquiry from the outside" and "inquiry from the inside." They maintained that "the quality of a piece of research is more critically indicated by the appropriateness of the paradigm selected than by the mere technical correctness of the methods used" (Evered and Louis, 1981, p. 386). They concluded that scientific analysis, inquiry from the outside, exhibits serious limitations.

Research from the outside systematically overlooks critical features...[which] include the definition of human action in specific settings, the actor's particular definition of his situation [world, field], the human interest [motives, purposes] of the organizational actor, and the historical context of the situation. Such shortcomings can be overcome by inquiry from the inside.

(Weiss, 1966, p. 392)



In utilizing such a methodology, the aim is not to test a set of hypotheses; rather the aim is to discover organization, pattern, or system in the subject of inquiry. This research is exploratory and hypothesis-generating. Much of the present study focuses on the experiences of individual interview subjects with no claim to hypothesis-testing or generalizability.

b. Methodological Difficulties in Textual Analysis

Textual analysis of interview transcripts in a case study approach presents some methodological pitfalls analogous to those experienced by those engaged in statistical analysis. In textual analysis, these pitfalls pertain to misinterpretation or misuse of the verbal data. These methodological sample measurements and use of parametric tests on ordinal data in statistical analysis. However, semantic analysis offers perhaps greater scope for misinterpretation by the researcher. Some of these semantic obstacles to accurate interpretation of interview transcripts were summarized succinctly by Buckley and Chiang:

Semantic problems include ambiguity, abuse of words and amphibology, which refers to a statement which is ambiguous because of its grammatical construction. A classic example of the latter is...

'The ship was christened by Mrs. Ccolidge. The lines of her bottom were admired by an enthusiastic crowd.'

Other forms of semantic distortion include:

(1) antiphrasis, the use of a word to convey an opposite meaning, e.g., 'but Brutus is an honorable man'; (2) apophasis, making a claim while pretending to deny it, e.g., 'without seeking to disparage anyone,

I must confess that I have doubts about Bill's appointment to the steering committee'; (3) aposiopesis, an incomplete statement which gives the reader the option of providing his own conclusion, e.g., 'if Amco raises its selling price by 5%, you know darn well what is likely to happen'; (4) catachresis, applying adjectives which are either too strong or too weak in the circumstances; e.g., with respect to the 5% increase in Amco's prices, 'Amco announced a fantastic increase in its prices' (too strong) or 'there was a very insignificant increase in prices' (too weak); (5) hyperbole, exaggeration: e.g., 'Amco is the best run company in the history of U.S. business enterprise'; (6) litotes, or the use of double or multiple negatives: e.g., 'I am not sure whether Amco does not face a problem in deciding whether or not to increase its prices if the economic picture gets better or worse'; (7) hypallage, or inverted relationship among words: e.g., 'the information system's management' instead of 'management's information system'; (8) prolepsis, making an event happen before it could have done so: e.g., 'Amco's failure in 1969 was attributable to the recession of 1974'--where, of course, the dates are usually omitted; (9) metonymy or using a surrogate term for the real object: e.g., 'The National Association of Accountants announced a professional designation to be known as the "Certificate in Management Accounting"'; (10) false suggestion, a statement which is true but encourages a false inference: e.g., 'Amco could be a poorly-managed company'; and many others.

(Buckley and Chiang, 1976, p. 43)

In summary, the case study approach offers an appropriate fit between the subject of this inquiry and the method of research. However, it presents methodological difficulties in defining the problem and in interpreting the data. It also raises questions regarding its external validity and generalizability.

#### B. LMET CONFERENCE

The second LMET research project which comprised the methodology of this study took place 29 September through 5

October 1982. The participants were individuals who were very knowledgeable of the Navy's Leadership and Management Education and Training program. Most of the conference members were involved with the improvement of the current LMET program in their daily jobs. Participants included representatives from McBer and Company, Navy Military Personnel Command (NMPC-62), Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET), LMET School Coronado, and Naval Postgraduate School. The conference was hosted by CAPT E.V. Haag, Officer in Charge, Human Resources Management Detachment, Alameda. Other participants included CDR Farrer, LT Cady, and ACCS Hasley of HRMD Alameda. The group of participants was unusual because virtually all members had significant experience both in LMET instruction or course design and in other Navy Human Resources Management activities. Their broad experience and training in organizational development had induced the participants to consider methods of reinforcing the LMET competencies addressed in the two week courses.

1. Purpose

The stated purpose of the conference was to ascertain any changes in demonstrated frequency of competencies among LMET graduates assigned to operational commands. Coupled with this objective was the desire to identify distinguishing characteristics of commands noted for their excellence which may promote increased competency use. A third central objective was to identify and outline LMET enhancing activities.

Several objectives of a more specific nature were also articulated. Table 15, provided by HRMD, Alameda details the conference objectives.

## 2. Conference Design

The methodology of the conference was designed along the lines of an organizational development problem-solving and planning intervention. The activities were facilitated at different times by CAPT Haag, Mr. Bryan of McBer and Company, ACCS Hasley of HRMD Alameda, and CDR Williams of NMPC-62. However, the intervention model presupposed a participative process in problem identification research design, data collection, analysis, and brainstorming possible means of reinforcing use of LMET competencies. All conference members actively contributed to the design and findings of the conference.

The first day of this intensive activity was dedicated to team building, initial problem identification, goal setting, and preparation for data collection. CAPT Haag facilitated the initial phases of the process. Mr. Bryan then assumed the role of facilitator in order to ensure that all participants were familiar with McBer and Company's most recent activities to provide ongoing evaluation of the LMET program's effectiveness and their efforts toward reinforcing and refining LMET instruction. He reviewed three recently developed instruments as examples of the direction of McBer's efforts. All were unpublished drafts. They included a

TABLE 15

LMET/HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPETENCY  
RELATIONSHIP RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVES

1. Around and about LMET skills

- collect data about command personnel skill integration and system support
- analyze data to determine key variables and significant factors
- assist in collecting NCAP data to extent practicable
- take first step in identification of unique characteristics of high performing commands
- complete preliminary concept design for LMET enhancing activities

WHAT ARE WE AFTER

- competency usage--not labels
- don't use competencies in isolation
- can you ask about one competency only
- do certain groups of competencies hang together--not necessarily as taught
- implications of which competencies at which levels
- can you attribute anything to the course
- reenforce LMET usage--good learnership/management in command
- sell the concept to the Navy as a whole PAO
- how do we best originate training to sustain
- organization rewards/individual rewards

"Competency Development Guide," the "Navy Competency Assessment Profile" (NCAP), and the course outline for the new Recruit Company Commander LMET course. Mr. Bryan stated that one use of the NCAP was to evaluate demonstrated changes in competency use of LMET graduates. He foresaw the employment of the NCAP and similar instruments to provide pre-test and post-test data.

The remainder of the day was spent generating the questions the group wished to answer during the course of the research project. These questions are illustrated in Table 16.

### 3. Data Collection

The entire research group visited a "high-performing" Navy command the following day in order to conduct interviews. The arrangements had been worked out in advance by HRMD Alameda. HRMD had also prepared the interview format exhibited in Table 17. This was designed to be a structured interview. The interview subjects, all LMET graduates, had been selected and notified in advance. The subjects were a representative sample of average and superior performers in pay grades E-6 through O-4.

Although the command was well-prepared to accommodate the researchers and the interview notably helpful, the interview process did not go as well as anticipated. The research group found the interview format to be awkward and redundant. The interviewers as a group were skeptical regarding the quality and reliability of the data that they had collected.

TABLE 16

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What competency/skills are required to do your job?
2. Describe a situation where you used leadership comp/skills that produced a desired effect.
3. That produced an effect not desired.
4. What enhanced use?
5. What blocked use?
6. What has been the most difficult comp/skill for you to use?
7. What has been the most helpful comp/skill for you?
8. What kind of outcomes have you had?
9. What rewards have you used or experienced by using comp/skills?
10. How can the command support you personally in developing the competencies...can support the rest of the command?
11. What was it you learned in LMET that impacted most on leadership skills demonstrated in this situation?
12. What do you remember about the LMET course?
13. Methods you think the command can use to support what you learned at LMET...(suggestions)--POD/seminars/workshops/GMT/lectures/PQS/verbal emphasis by command
14. Thinking about the best unit you've been in and the worst--what was the difference between them?

TABLE 17

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Listed below are questions about LMET Competency Usage and actual or potential reinforcement that could be covered during the individual interviews. The relative emphasis of each question in specific interviews could vary according to the role of the interviewee.

1. Have you attended an LMET course?
  - Which course?
  - When did you attend?
  - Where did you attend?
2. Has your immediate supervisor attended LMET?
  - Which course?
  - When?
3. Have any of your subordinates attended LMET?
  - How many?
  - When?
4. Have you consciously attempted to apply the LMET competencies on your job?
  - Describe a specific situation in which you applied them.
  - Describe the results you achieved by using the competencies.
5. Which five competencies have you been able to use most often?
  - Describe specific situations in which you applied them.
  - Describe the results you achieved by applying them.
6. What factors, both personal and command, have encouraged you to use the competencies?
  - Give specific examples for each factor.
  - Describe the results or impact of those factors on your use of the competencies.



TABLE 17 (Cont'd)

7. Has your immediate supervisor encouraged or helped you to use the competencies on the job?
  - If so, how? (Specific examples)
  - What were the results of those examples of encouragement and help?
8. Which five competencies have you had the most difficulty using on your job?
9. What factors, both personal and command, have made it difficult for you to use these competencies on the job?
  - Give specific examples for each factor.
  - What was the specific impact of each factor?
10. Which five competencies have your subordinates been able to use most often on the job?
11. What factors, both personal and command, have encouraged your subordinates to use these competencies?
12. Which five competencies have your subordinates had the most difficulty using on the job?
13. What factors, both personal and command, have made it difficult for your subordinates to use these competencies on the job?
14. Where has LMET had the greatest positive impact on individual or unit performance within the command?
  - How have you measured the performance impact (objective and/or subjective measures).
15. Have you undertaken any formal or informal efforts to reinforce the use of the LMET competencies among your subordinates?
  - If so, please describe those efforts as specifically as possible.
  - What results have they achieved?

TABLE 17 (Cont'd)

16. Are you aware of any formal or informal efforts within the command to reinforce people's use of the LMET competencies?
  - If yes, please describe those efforts as specifically as possible.
  - What specific results have been achieved?
17. What specific things could be done within -our command that would help you use the competencies more often or more effectively on the job?
18. Who do you see as the key people within the command who could most effectively reinforce effective use of the competencies on the job?
  - Why?
19. What objective performance measures within your command would be most useful for measuring the impact of LMET on individual, work unit, or command performance?
20. Looking back on the LMET course you attended, what do you remember that was particularly effective or helpful?
  - What, if anything, would you change in the course to make it more effective?

The ensuing day was spent in re-design of the interview format that would be more likely to elicit the data the group sought. Some initial interpretations were offered as "strawman" hypotheses for the group to discuss. The day's activities tended to clarify to the research group some of the salient issues regarding the effect of command climate on LMET competency use. Two new interview forms were corporately designed for use in interviews at the second command. These are exhibited in Tables 18 and 19. They were termed "leading BEI's" by Mr. Bryan of McBer and Company. Ironically, the data gathered from the re-designed instruments proved to be no more or less useful than the information collected from interviews at the first command. The interviewers had done a better job than their initial impressions had led them to believe.

#### 4. Coding and Brainstorming

The final day of the conference was devoted to classification and interpretation of the interview data gathered from the two commands. A total of 56 individual and group interviews had been conducted. Use of unobtrusive measures in observation provided further information regarding command factors. Additionally, one of the activities had just completed an HRM survey. This information served to confirm certain interviewers' impressions. After information from each individual's interviews had been recorded on master charts for each research question specified, the issues

TABLE 12

## LMET COMPETENCY INTERVIEW FORM

SITUATION DESCRIPTION	QUESTIONS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What competency/skills are required to do your job?</li> <li>• Describe a situation where you used leadership comp/skills that produced a DESIRED effect.</li> <li>• That produced an effect NOT DESIRED.  * What type problem???  COMPETENCIES DESCRIBED        </li> <li>• What enhanced use?</li> <li>• What blocked use?</li> <li>• What has been the most difficult comp/skill for you to use?</li> <li>• What has been the most helpful comp/skill for you?</li> <li>• What kind of outcomes have you had?</li> <li>• What rewards have you used or experienced by using comp/skills?</li> <li>• How can the command support you personally in developing the competencies...can support the rest of the command?</li> <li>• What was it you learned in LMET that impacted most on leadership skills demonstrated in this situation?</li> </ul>
	<hr/> <p>SEPARATE QUESTIONS</p> <hr/> <p>What do you remember about the LMET course...</p>

TABLE 18 (Cont'd)

Methods you think the command  
can use to support what you  
learned at LMET...(sugges-  
tions)

POD

Seminars/workshops

GMT/lectures/PQS

Verbal emphasis by command

Thinking about the best unit  
you've been in and the worst  
what was the difference  
between them?

TABLE 19

LMET GROUP INTERVIEW FORM

How are new people treated?

How are people rewarded: Disciplined?

Why are they motivated?

What do supervisors do that are effective?

Do any problems get in the way of getting the job done?

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COMPETENCIES NOTED:

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reflecting the greatest consensus among the subject's responses were analyzed.

The conference concluded with a brainstorming session regarding means to enhance LMET activities, based on the initial findings.

#### IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

##### A. EXPERIENCE OF RESEARCHERS

One of the interesting findings of the NFS research regarding LMET competencies in heterogeneous work groups was the change that occurred within the research group. During the six month period when the researchers were heavily involved in the interviewing and coding process, they became intimately familiar with McBer's LMET competencies and behavioral indicators. Indeed, by the end of the coding phase, all seven graduate students could quote the competencies and behavioral indicators verbatim. The interviewing had been a fascinating experience for the students. Each student had at least one fortunate experience in which he or she interviewed a superior performer whose narrative of significant leadership incidents personally affected the researcher. The interview transcripts animated the LMET competencies in a way that an academic discussion could not equal. It is doubtful that certain interview subjects will ever be forgotten by the researchers. The heightened awareness of the researchers, coupled with many vivid personal examples of superior performance, began to change the behavior of the student researchers themselves. The effect was similar to that of the Hawthorne studies. The student researchers were aware that the research experience was reinforcing their own use of the LMET competencies.



Positive changes in demonstration of initiative, goal-setting, planning and organization, skillful use of influence, and team building were evident in the student's interactions. In fact, these changes became something of a self-conscious joke, and the students frequently called out the alphanumeric codes when they observed the behavioral indicators of the LMET competencies in each other. The changes since the student's participation in the research project ceased are also interesting. As they resumed their usual student roles and duties, their use of the LMET competencies also gradually declined. They were not in supervisory positions, thus the opportunities to employ some of the competencies were limited. Their acute sensitivity toward competency demonstration in others also lessened as they became engrossed in individual tasks. This experience is viewed by the author as a metaphor of the behavioral cycles of most LMET graduates.

**B. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING LMET COMPETENCY USE; FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS**

Neither the statistical analysis completed by the NPS research group nor the textual analysis conducted by the author, revealed any behavioral differences between LMET graduates and the control group. Certain individuals indicated behavioral changes which they attributed to their LMET experience but no significant differences could be discovered for the LMET graduates as a group. All 93 interview transcripts were reviewed by the author to determine environmental

factors which may affect use of LMET competencies. A qualitative analysis revealed that the following factors may influence the LMET graduates' use of competencies: time constraints; manning constraints; leadership example set by superiors; communication flow; attitude toward inspections; emphasis on subordinate development; perceived lack of support; and lack of a reward system for competency use. Relevant examples will be provided for each factor. Again, those examples are subjective descriptions of specific, critical incidents narrated by the interview subjects. The purpose of providing such information is to point to organizational factors which may warrant further study. No claim is made regarding the generalizability of these findings.

1. Perceived Lack of Support

The following narrative describes the frustrations of a superior performer. In his role as Master-At-Arms, he had apprehended an E-3, with a previous drug offense, for possession of five ounces of marijuana aboard ship.

Anyway, according to CNO's policies, he should have been booted up. However, his department head, his leading chief, and his LPO could not say enough good stuff about him. And it was dismissed with a very stiff verbal warning from the Commanding Officer. Ticked me off a little bit. If they're going to play the game, let's do it the way it's supposed to.... It shocked me that his department head and leading chief and LPO could say so much good stuff about him. Basically they were lying through their teeth to keep the morale up--to get more work out of him if they could.

The Chief Master-At-Arms aboard the ship--he's the Chief Gunner's Mate. He cares--it's just that he's had his toes stepped on so many times that he knew what

should have happened but--I can't say he's given up--he's fed up with the futility of him trying to do the job the way it should be and being either ignored or told not to worry about it.

The next narrative also happens to involve drug use on duty.

The narrator, an E-4, describes his disgust that an E-6 allowed the incident to occur and that his superiors, an E-7 and an O-3, refused to initiate any disciplinary action.

I'd been here for a couple of months, I guess....More or less I was just starting to get my feet on the ground....We had a plane that went down at [another] base. They wanted me to go over there and trouble-shoot it. I was sent with [two E-t's, an E-3], and some reservist. So we all get in this car with the senior E-6 being put in charge of this operation.... We didn't even get off the base, and this [E-3] pulls out a bag of dope--starts rolling joints, right? So here I am--I'm new in the outfit...and I'm going--what the hell are you doing? We're going up to fix an airplane, you know? This senior E-6, he didn't think nothing of it....

So the guy actually lit up in the car?

Yeah.

But this E-6 didn't say anything?

No, he didn't say a damn thing. Everything was cool.

What did the [E-3] say?

Hey, we always do this, you know?

So we got back, and I talked to the maintenance officer and the maintenance chief.

What did he do?

He didn't do anything. Quality assurance, this guy's a senior E-6. If you're quality assurance, you're not letting people smoke dope....I just resigned myself to--this place is so fucked up that I just couldn't believe it.

Another illuminating example of lack of support from seniors is presented in the following example narrated by a superior-performing ACl. One of his subordinates had disobeyed

a direct order and left the control tower while on duty. The ACL wished to bring the subordinate to Captain's Mast for such flagrant disobedience but his superior squashed the chit because he did not want the C.O. to find out that he had allowed a television in the Control Tower.

I wrote her up and they asked me--did I want to push the chit? I said yes. Hell yes. How's it going to look. Anyways, so we wrote her up, and went down to the division officer and he decided--how's it going to look--he says--going to Bldg. X--which is where the highups are--the captain and the XO.

As from a supervisory position--a supervisor's viewpoint or whatever--I felt that what she did was serious enough to warrant severe punishment and not just--like they always, or most of the time do--push them all aside. A chit would go down there--hey we can handle this--EMI or whatever. I didn't want that. I wanted here to get something she'd remember--that she would never do it again.

--what he was worried about was the CO looking at us--at our division and what [the Division Officer] was worried about was how [the C.O.] had said before--no TV in the tower--I guess.

## 2. Time/Manning Constraints

In the following passage, a First Class Petty Officer expresses his fear regarding safety in a department responsible for handling nuclear weapons.

Especially more and more the way the job is getting done because we get more and more work to do with less and less people. How're we accomplishing this? We're getting to the point now where we just raid into the jobs and flail away at them. And get it accomplished. But my God--at what cost? If we didn't move predominantly fake ordnance here, we probably would have had an accident by now. Throw stuff around--leave tools out--we'll do the job--take tools out--do the job--leave the tools. They don't button up after it's over with.

### 3. Leadership Example Set by Superiors

In this incident, a recently selected Chief Petty Officer had been accused of making sexually derogatory comments. The accusation had been made via some anonymous notes in the department's suggestion box. The soon-to-be chief was called into the department head's office to discuss these charges. The interview subject was considered by the author to be something of a diamond in the rough.

I had just found out that I had been selected for E-7. And I was called over here, and I had assumed that I was going to be given the piece of paper--you know--that officially selected me. And also to go through--to start the rigamarole that they call the chief's initiation....And the first thing that comes out is-- 'This isn't what you think it's about.' Then they told me about the notes: 'Petty Officer X tucks his shirt in his pants when everyone's around.' 'Petty Officer X uses crude and vulgar language.' 'Petty Officer X uses sexual innuendos when speaking.'... And I--hell, I'd been in the Navy 18 years...and this is the first time I'd ever heard of anything like this. And it floored me....I was feeling I was in the lion's den. Felt like a Christian in the coliseum.... But then again, here's where the hypocrisy comes in. During this time I saw the exact same thing goin on with the people above me. They were doing the exact same thing--saying the same damn things--yet I was the one getting nailed for it. And it just didn't set right.

In the following passage, a superior performing E-8 expresses his reservations regarding the impression Navy recruiters make on minority groups regarding racial fragmentation in the Navy.

The Filipino recruited in the Filipino community. The Hispanic recruited in the Hispanic community. He was tagged as the individual to go head up a low-rider conference in [a large city]. And a black was tasked to go out and get into the black community. And of course myself was tasked with doing all the middle to upper income...areas....

I think if you go down and you send somebody like myself down there--who took the time--say in the hispanic community--to learn to speak the language or to understand what their culture's like--would show that the Navy showed its interest across the board from all different races--for myself to go out and recruit in that area.

If you send somebody out of a like race--I think the message that they're going to be getting is going to be--hey look--likes are going to recruit likes and that's the way it is in the Navy...we have a separate black group over here...then we're going to have a separate Filipino group. That's my own personal feelings.

In the following example, an E-7 superior performer describes his command's inconsistent treatment of individuals exhibiting possible drug or alcohol problems. He points out the danger to morale and safety of such inconsistent leadership.

What I found was an inconsistency there where there's one person that was--came to work incapacitated--well they sent him directly to sick bay which was an approved thing by the Navy standards....However, there's certain cases where people who have a lot of blud chips built up let's say, and we have a tendency to kind of bend the rules a little bit....One person got a blood test--they had blood out of his arm--which happened before he even got out of the truck or something. And the next person--well they just sent him home and sleep it off--and so forth. Then after I got into the situation real deeply and pinned management down--well they tell me it's too late now. And these things--they irk me quite a bit and I think a lot of the people in the Navy and also the airplanes that they work on--cause if there's any mishap that goes down--you're talking about 23 people which is probably going to go down. So these are some things that I really pay attention to--now we still don't have a solid program within this command--like I say--I'm not trying to put the Command on report or anything like that--but it's what I'm trying to do to help the situation. Lay a level of consistency there of how we will deal with these kinds of situations.

#### 4. Attitude Toward Inspections

A short-sighted attitude toward inspections was brought out in some interviews. In the following example, a Lieutenant was informed by his First Class Petty Officer while they were supervising loading of weapons.

We got big problems, you know. Some guys are getting stoned at work.

[I] talked to the division officer and the...maintenance officer and they just kind of didn't want to make an issue out of it...deal with the problem. But we had an NTPI coming up--Nuclear Technical Proficiency Inspection. Now if you go and get all these guys busted for drugs--they're on the drug program--they can't be loading special weapons--nuclear weapons in the PRP--personnel got's to do it.

#### 5. Training and Subordinate Development

This area appears to be one of the differentiating factors between high performing commands and others. Several examples are presented to exhibit the wide range of approaches successfully utilized.

The following example comes from a command which placed great importance on training. In this case the CPO felt that the petty officer trainer was hindering the progress of her subordinate.

Well at the time, they were training in radar--and she just it didn't matter what the trainee did, she picked everything apart--whether it was right or wrong. And again, I don't--I wasn't there, I didn't see the actual discrepancy or whatever as it happened. But she was constantly picking at everything that the trainee did. If it was a good approach as far as a good radar approach, she might rate it as fair. If it was a fair approach, she'd just tell her how lousy it was. And just downgrade everything that she did. We had to separate them--getting back to the trainee, she thought she was doing a good job. The supervisor, after monitoring

her, thought she was doing a good job. And that there was no reason for the third female who was doing the training to continually be downgrading what was being done. And it was hampering the trainee's progression toward qualification. We separated them--I took the one that was trainer--put her in another section. Explained to the new section leader what had been taking place. Explained to the female that type of behavior was not acceptable and the female that was training--within a very short period after that--was qualified. Having someone else train her.

And I explained to [the trainer] that when you're training somebody on a particular position or in any situation, that if they're doing a poor job--you explain to them what's being done wrong--explain to them how they can better do the job and that downgrading them isn't helping anybody to progress. And that it would be to her advantage to help people. Again explaining what's wrong with their technique or their control, and how they can improve it. It's that simple. Instead, again, of saying--that's a lousy approach. Tell them what was wrong with it and tell them or show them how they can improve it.

A different approach to subordinate development is presented below. It was equally effective.

6 petty officers--E-5's and E-6's who were at the club for lunch--getting blitzed--drunk. Come back and couldn't perform their duties. Mainly if they was supposed to be working high up aloft--on the king boatswain--harnesses. And he's up there bobbing and weaving around--so drunk he couldn't even work. So the next day I pulled them all in--knocked them off first--told them to go down and hit the rack or hit your liberty or whatever. Next day pulled them in and restricted them. Told them they couldn't leave the ship the rest of the weekend. They couldn't understand why. I told them--the Navy don't like you going over and getting drunk--drinking at noon hour and coming back and trying to perform your duties. Cause the non-rates see it and then the non-rates go over drinking. Pretty soon there ain't nobody getting the work done. At the time we had a hell of a lot of work to do--in preparation for refresher training.

--they wanted to know why they were restricted? This is right after I came aboard--I'd been aboard about three months. Couldn't understand why I restricted them. So I told them why I restricted them. Fucking went over and got drunk and didn't come back to work when they was scheduled to. That's that.



So what did they do?

They stayed aboard all weekend and got the work done. Bitched and moaned and cried a lot.

Was anybody supervising them while they were onboard that weekend?

Yes sir. The chief boatswain's mate. He made sure they did what I told them they was to do.

What rank would he be then?

E-6 and E-7.

Senior to them?

No. One of them was. The other one was junior to them, matter of fact. That degraded them even more. Fuck'em--they'd already screwed up. That's their fault.

This particular Chief Petty Officer summarized his philosophy toward subordinate development as follows:

--you don't want to do it to a new kid in the Navy--he don't know what the hell is going on--you give him a fair breathing time to get squared away--then you start screaming at him.

Another Chief related the following story as an example of subordinate development:

This young lad that worked for me--I was leading chief of the weapons department at that time--got caught coming across the brow with booze.

Well, he got--the Master at Arms put him on report and he went up to Captain's Mast--and he got 15 days restriction and a fine. He did this restriction--didn't miss a muster--paid his fine and was alright for about 30 days. Got caught again. But this time he thought he was going to get away with it. Threw it over the side.

I give him some EMI. I thought I had his attention and I sat him down and I counseled him and told him not to do that shit no more. Booze is not allowed aboard ship. I would venture to say it was two weeks to the

day he got caught coming aboard the brow with a half pint of Suntory strapped to his leg. Well we put him on report and brought him up to the office. I'll bet there was probably 15 officers in there. [I thought] Aw--what the fuck. He's standing there in front of my desk--take your hat off. So he took his hat off. I stepped around my desk and I open handed him--right along the head. Now put your fucking hat on--get back to work. Well he did 60 days restriction and a bust. And right now today he's a chief.

On board?

No--he's not on board. In a squadron on the East Coast.

But this guy writes me letters every now and then. And he keeps bringing that back up--that's why I was giggling--thought it was funnier than hell. Keeps telling me--the only thing that ever stuck in his mind--he's a poor little rich boy--never held accountable to anything. Could give a shit less about the money--could give a shit less about the restriction--so he had to stay aboard--so what? Well when I made him take his hat off--and that slap up alongside the head--that rang his chimes a little bit and then made him put his hat on--and go to work--that stuck in his gourd.

The following E-8 related an example of subordinate development that was so successful that it reinforced the senior chief's utilization of these competencies.

We were talking one day and she felt she'd been getting a bad shake in the military. Being a female, you know. And she had never really been given a chance to be a controller. I was the tower manager at the time. I told her--if this is what you really want, I'll help you do it. I'll make you a good controller--in fact, I'll make you the best controller. And I'll give you every chance you need. But I'll tell you it's going to be hard because I'll expect more from you because I have given you my time. She said fine. So we went about her training. At times I was pretty hard on her, you know. But she took it all in stride. And she did--she is qualified. She is my best controller. And this--it makes me feel real good--somebody that never had a chance--her whole outlook on the Navy and males in the Navy is different. I think I had a lot to do with

changing it because I give her this chance. I'm not the person that believes just because she's a female that she can't do anything. I believe everybody can do anything. Because, to me, I can't is not in my vocabulary.

And I'd do things and she'd ask me--why did I do it that way and I'd tell her. And I'd show her different ways to do things--easier. I just told her--you want to be this good, I'll make you this good.

Do you remember her specific reaction at that point?

She just looked at me. She didn't say anything. She just smiled. I think it kind of shocked her. No one had ever made this offer to her.

And I started putting her on straight days so she would be exposed to a lot more air traffic than she would be at nights. So I was there everytime she was working--I was plugged in with her. Tell her what to do. Even after she'd do something--I'd let her do it--then I'd tell her an easier way to do it and tell her what she could have done to make it easier for her. And make it a little more expeditious. Just small things. Same thing you do with any controller. I used to nitpick her a lot more than I used to do other people.

One day we was just sitting and talking. She said--thank you. For what? For helping me. I said--no problem. It's my job.

No--just that with her I saw that I did it with one person. Well, I said, if I can do it with one person, I can do it with someone else. Then I just started pushing a lot of people that I saw had the potential and weren't using it. Got all the potential--brought it out. Let them know they did have it. And make them use it. Got a pretty good qualification rate here in the five years I've been here.

Another supervisor used an overtly maternal approach to subordinate development with great success.

Oh, I'm so proud. My buttons pop off. I just--we have one girl out there--her main mission in life was to get out of the Navy or be a...corpsman. She said--oh, I can't do this. Or, I don't like this job, it's greasy or blah, blah, blah. Or whatever. She's been working with me now about a year and her whole attitude--she'd done 180. She's become an effective leader and she is

just barely a 3rd Class. She just sewed it on. She is so motivated--I'm so proud of her. I feel like she's one of my own children. She's about the same age as my own kids anyway--so I really feel proud of her. For the change she personally has made. And she attitude-wise, she's accepted her rating now. She likes her job--not as well as other people like their jobs--but she doesn't talk about wanting to be a corpsman every other sentence. She's happy, she's adjusted and I'm real proud of her. I'm extremely proud of my crew and I think they know it. I think that's part of it too. I more or less kept on her--when she did a good job. She would say--I can't do this, I don't do this very good. And I gave her a little nickname. Gerdy, I'd say, you're great. You know, and so I say--Gerdy, you're great. You're doing good. Gerdy, that's good. Made all the g's. When she signs cards for everybody now, she puts Gerdy. I just tell her she's doing a good job. And she could do it. And I tell--that's why you're making the big bucks--you'll make 3rd Class at this rate. You'd be a bed pan emptier the rest of your life, you'd be an E-3, you know if you went as a corpsman. And I kept telling her, you know, all the advantages--not pushing at her, but just in a way where she knew I was concerned about her--wanted her to be happy. But, you know, she opened her own eyes. Let her do it herself. I don't want her to think I was pushing torpedo mince meat down her throat. But I just told her--you done good. Look at that. The last time you fixed that pad, the weapon ran great. You know, let her know that she is an effective torpedoman. She's not a--now she know it. I tell her--you're great and look at that and this did good. And now she knows it. And she's come so far and she's grown up a lot too. I let her have responsibility. She's a good worker. I told her she's one of my best. I tell them all that. And they are.

How did she respond to the additional responsibility?

Superbly.

Initially?

Shocked. Let me do this? Why is she having me be in charge? Cause you're good at it. That's good. Now, she ready--she could be in charge today out there. She could take over my job today. She could do it. She could step right into it. That's saying a lot for a kid that didn't want to be one to begin with.

#### 6. Communication

Barriers to communication were cited repeatedly as major factors in de-motivation, inefficiency, and interpersonal

friction. This area appears to be a key roadblock to utilization of LMET competencies. The nature and degree of communications problems vary, but one barrier is attitude. As one chief so aptly stated:

Hell, no, I don't ask their opinion. Opinions are like assholes--everyone's got one.

In the following passage, a Second Class Petty Officer described some communication difficulties that he perceived in the manner in which officers spoke to enlisted personnel. He found officers to be, in general, patronizing and intimidating. This description was prompted by his relation of an incident in which a pilot had bullied them into allowing him to fly a plane off an aircraft carrier despite the mechanics' statement that the plane was "down." The aircraft had a massive hydraulic failure in flight. They were all lucky that the plane did not crash.

Ok. Officers--to enlisted guys--officers are kind of intimidating. It's not like a chief--a chief is almost human. An E-7, they're pretty human. But as far as officers go, they're college-educated. They know this and they know that. They're the guys that when the word comes down--they're usually the ones who're enforcing it. They have direct supervision over us. So we know that they're always there--riding us. Our effort is to please them as much as possible. To keep them from having a confrontation with an officer. Because when he talks to you, he sort of talks down to you. He's not going to talk on the same level. It's not like talking to a chief or 1st Class or one of your peers.

In the next incident, another Second Class Petty Officer praised his division officer for opening up freer lines of communication in the division. He felt that this

served to encourage cohesiveness and productivity in his Personnel Office.

Oh yeah. We used to have bitch sessions in there--we'd sit down face to face and spit it out--exactly what was on our minds.

Who participated in the bitch sessions? You and who else?

We did it mainly with Lcdr X--when he was a Lt--was the personnel officer--the guy was great--the guy's fucking great. He would sit us down once a week--Friday afternoon and we would have our bitch sessions--find out what exactly--sometimes there wasn't even anything going on--there were a couple of major incidents--

Communication is mentioned only in passing by a Senior Chief Petty Officer who had described the difficulties that his Branch Officer, an Ensign, had encountered in establishing authority and gaining recognition for a major project well done.

I could not tell you--I could not tell you. Everybody looks down on Ensigns. We got officers who won't even talk to Ensigns.

In the next incident, a division officer related some of the consequences of a situation in which his department head relied on the information of an E-5 and chronically by-passed the chain of command.

But once I got there, I told the--first I told the EM1 to tell the EM2 to stay out of the chief engineer's stateroom. I didn't ever want to see him up there. That didn't work. Because whenever the EM2 did something wrong and myself or the EM1 assigned him extra duty--put on report or whatever, things just mysteriously never happened--once it went past my level. The chief engineer is protecting him--he had two or three of his boys more or less picked out, within the department--who could do no wrong--and that was the situation.

In the following narrative, a department head described how he overcame years of "bad blood" between his department and the Civilian Personnel office on base through a series of face-to-face discussions. By establishing effective communication with this office, he was able to receive three permanent ceiling points and hire civilian personnel. His department had gotten by with one temporary for years prior to that, causing tremendous backlogs in production.

So the asst. division officer said--hey, go over to personnel and find out what's going on--meeting people first-hand. And see what we can do about it. And he went over there and had a very negative experience--he was like everybody else. A lot of bad blood apparently between Civilian personnel?

Personnel which was NAS. And didn't really get much resolved--Pandora's Box--I guess. And it ended up with that individual and myself going over there and talking with them. And we got an awful lot resolved and within a month--we had the paperwork set up where we were going to hire this individual permanently and then boost her up to a 7. And that looked great but that didn't solve our problem. Some more liaison with [our ISIC]--starting looking around saying--hey, look we're falling on our swords here--we need to get some help--how do we go about it? Nobody knew how to find ceiling points or anything else--eventually what we did was reinvent the wheel--it must have existed at some time or other--but certainly never existed here--and within three months we had three editor-writers on line--tripled our resources in that area. Hired two additional civilians--never could have been done before and got it done. So once again we had a very positive incident--the things that maybe you're interested in there--the interaction with NAS personnel and the fact that what was really necessary--was to go over and meet the people myself--the syllabus director and the asst. division officer--and get to know the people a little bit. It seemed like a lot of the bad blood kind of died--nobody really knew where it came from. Things weren't really important anymore--all the problems that had made it impossible before--and it was incredible what was accomplished in such a short period of time.

## 7. Incongruent Reward System

Another recurring theme in the interviews was that individuals worked toward what was rewarded. However, the reward systems in organizations often inadvertently promoted dysfunctional behavior.

A very highly regarded Senior Chief Petty Officer expressed his views regarding his superiors' motivation and its effect on their decision-making. His views reflected experience at many commands.

The department heads--Lcdr--more senior and they're very reluctant to rock the boat. What I mean by that is--you may have all your ducks in a row and everything may be legal--however, they want to look at all the facets of how it's going to affect their career and how it's going to affect the CO's career and how it's going to affect the XO's career. And their criteria or whether or not to pass this thing on up the chain of command is that criteria. It's not the criteria of--is it legal and is it right--how's it going to affect them in the future.

The following passage illustrates an interesting twist on the management reward system. The narrator, a Chief Petty Officer, had ordered three black airmen to perform a particular task along with 13 white personnel in the division. When accused of discriminatory practices, the narrator fully expected to be supported, not on the basis of the facts, but due to his perception of the views of his superiors. In this example, he was confronted by civilian investigators from the NAACP.

They said--we have a complaint filed against you with the National Chapter of the NAACP. I says--whoa--back on down. I said--the first thing that you do--you go see the squadron duty officer and the executive officer and you check with the commanding officer. If the



commanding officer says you can talk with me--you talk to me--but until then you don't come into my shop. Now would you kindly leave? Well, my CO comes from Meridian Mississippi. The XO comes from Mobile, Alabama.

A division officer described her frustration with the difficulties of admonishing and attempting to fire a civil service individual who exhibited bizarre behavior. She was shocked to find that she could not require him to have a medical evaluation.

[he would] just totally lose his train of thought--and stop--slurrish--sluggish--if it had been a military individual, he immediately would have had a competency review exam run to find out if this individual was on drugs--had an alcohol problem--but with--we really can't do that--not a union but something like a union.

She never succeeded in firing the individual, but after documenting his behavior for a year, she managed to have him transferred to a position where "he wasn't as dangerous."

A Chief Petty Officer related some of the consequences of the position description system influencing the behavior of another civil service employee.

So I asked him--well on this piece of gear will you give a lecture. And he said--no sir. And I thought he was just joking. So I'm still...on it. Aw come on, give a lecture. I thought he was going to finally say yes. He said no. He said--I do not get paid to give lectures. That was the end of that. So I just kind of backed down.

So that was the end of it?

Yeah. I tried to come back later and ask him--well how come you're not willing to give lectures? Well, the simple fact is we're not getting paid for it. According to my contract, I don't have to do anything that I'm not supposed to do. This is all a part of me. And it

really struck me as kind of strange too, you know. We're pretty friendly in this shop. Everybody is on, like I said, a first name basis. And it's more or less like a request to help us out. Like a plea to help us out. They just turned their backs.

The following incident, described by a First Class Petty Officer, illustrates what happened to a civilian technician in his department when quantity of repair work was stressed as the primary criterion of productivity.

He was the best TACAN technician that this hangar ever had. One of the things he would do would be to start from the first page of the book and go step-by-step through a TACAN and when he was done with the book--the TACAN was done--and it would stay out for 100 hours or more, which is fabulous running time for an old TACAN. He was a fantastic technician. And he was a good natured guy and he just got fed up with the program.

You mentioned that the division officers--some of them--were concerned about his output. What was his output compared to the average?

Compared to the average--maybe two, three or four units a week depending on the problems they had. But you could always guarantee a good TACAN out of him.

Did you feel that he was one of the people who wasted time?

No, definitely not. He never wasted any time as far as I can remember. He was always working.

Very meticulous?

Yes. He was really good.

Finally, another First Class Petty Officer described an experience in which the civilian contractor pay and per diem system served as incentive to retard productivity.

I don't know how to explain it but I kind of expect this out of Civil Service? Ok? It's not that I have--over the years I've seen them work. They'll take the job and they'll instead of wanting to get it done, ok, they're getting paid probably by the hour, or overtime,

or something like that. The longer they can take the job, especially when they're not--they came from the East Coast--fly out here. Especially drawing per diem. The longer they can take on the job, the more money they're going to make. You can't argue with them there. There really isn't anything that a dumb white hat like I am that can do to civilians.

#### C. LMET CONFERENCE FINDINGS

Individual findings of the conference members were collated and a frequency analysis performed. The central research questions and the most representative findings are presented in the following tables excerpted from the conference report produced by HRMD Alameda. These findings tended to agree with the author's findings from the interview analysis that command climate influenced the individual's use of LMET competencies. This report also confirmed that emphasis on training, communications, and a congruent reward system were perceived to be crucial factors in either inhibiting or retarding LMET competency use. Both commands visited for research purposes were considered to be high performing commands. An interesting by-product of this research was the finding that the BEI technique provided a useful method to flesh out and provide more in depth research indicated by the HRM survey results. Used together, the two methods of inquiry seemed to provide a clearer understanding of some of the causative factors in attitudes of command personnel, thereby indicating avenues toward improving specific aspects of command climate.

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of both projects indicated a very favorable reaction to the Navy LMET program. People like the courses and feel that they meet a need for training in these areas. However, there is no hard or soft evidence to indicate that LMET, at this point in its implementation, has brought about any behavioral changes in the graduates as a group. Individuals who have demonstrated behavioral changes which they attribute to LMET exhibit the following characteristics. They had a strong desire to change and indicated that they felt they had room for improvement in leadership and management skills. They had some experience in supervisory positions in the Navy, but they tended to be relatively junior. That is, they did not have decades of experience in the Navy to formulate and rigidify their values and rationale for management practices. They returned directly to a management position after graduating from LMET. They had some initial successes in putting into practice some of the LMET competencies. They mentioned the example or guidance of an immediate superior or peer role model. Finally, they tended to be assigned to Navy commands noted for their organizational effectiveness and stress on subordinate development.

The provisions of the LMET program for self-evaluation and competency reinforcement through use of the student journals is largely ineffective except in cases where the

individual is unusually motivated. The organization and the LMET graduate's immediate superior appear to play crucial roles in influencing the individual's use of LMET competencies.

The following recommendations have been inferred from this study. Efforts should continue to send Navy personnel to LMET courses immediately prior to reporting to their next duty assignments. Efforts to market LMET to Navy personnel would foster continued interest and support of the LMET program. Efforts to reinforce LMET competency awareness and utilization at the unit level may encourage actual behavioral changes in LMET graduates. A program to promote increased organizational emphasis on effective communications, subordinate development, and problem solving techniques would increase the probability of providing a command atmosphere receptive to the individual's attempts to change his behavior. In the author's opinion, a well-designed program would serve to increase the effectiveness of the current level of training.

The author also noted that, with certain exceptions, little interest, knowledge, cooperation or support was evident in LMET and HRM organizations below the staff level. Occasionally, outright antagonism and rivalry were noted between some HRM and LMET personnel. It could be surmised that this attitude is an unfortunate and unintended consequence

of the initial decision to establish independent activities tasked to provide LMET instruction. The author believes that Human Resources Management activities have the potential to implement the recommended reinforcement activities for LMET competency use at the operating unit level. It is recommended that an ongoing pilot project tasking co-located LMET and HRM units to engage in cross-training facilitators, develop prototype workshops, and implement a concerted LMET reinforcement plan of action in consonance with local operating units, in order to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of such a program. It is believed that a joint program to reinforce LMET competency use would strengthen the credibility of the LMET program, provide greater coherence to current HRM activities, and possibly improve the performance of Navy commands.

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